Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask problems through job design
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Cited by:
- Ester Manna, 2015. "Intrinsically Motivated Agents in Teams," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2015/326, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- repec:lan:wpaper:3661 is not listed on IDEAS
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"Incentive pay and performance: Insider econometrics in a multi-unit firm,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 100-115.
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- Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel & Yossi Spiegel, 2010. "A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 55-85, March.
- Bryson, Alex & Buraimo, Babatunde & Simmons, Rob, 2011.
"Do salaries improve worker performance?,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 424-433, August.
- Alex Bryson & Babatunde Buraimo & Rob Simmons, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1019, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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