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A Simple Model Of Optimal Tax Systems: Taxation, Measurement And Uncertainty

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  • SANJIT DHAMI
  • ALI AL‐NOWAIHI

Abstract

The neglect of administrative issues is a serious limitation of optimal tax theory, with implications for its practical applicability. We focus on an important class of administrative problems, namely that the tax bases are measured with some error. We also consider the full set of tax instruments. We find that consumption taxes can perform the ‘social insurance role of taxation’, a role previously ascribed only to income taxes. A combination of income and consumption taxes can hedge income and measurement‐error risks better, relative to the imposition of either type of tax alone. The optimal tax rate is increasing in the precision with which the corresponding tax base is measured. The taxpayer engages in precautionary savings in response to income uncertainty and measurement problems. Differential commodity taxes tailored to the measurability characteristics of the different tax bases dominate uniform commodity taxes. However, as an economy becomes large, optimal taxes converge to uniform (or flat rate) taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanjit Dhami & Ali Al‐Nowaihi, 2006. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Tax Systems: Taxation, Measurement And Uncertainty," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(6), pages 645-669, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:74:y:2006:i:6:p:645-669
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00521.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Matsaganis, Manos & Flevotomou, Maria, 2010. "Distributional implications of tax evasion in Greece," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 26074, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. DOMBOU T., Dany R., 2018. "Shadow effect from Laffer tax allergy: New tax policy tool to fight tax evasion," MPRA Paper 98646, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Dany DOMBOU, 2020. "Shadow Effect From Laffer Tax Allergy: New Tax Policy Tool To Fight Tax Evasion," Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 27-46.
    4. Matsaganis, Manos & Benedek, Dóra & Flevotomou, Maria & Lelkes, Orsolya & Mantovani, Daniela & Nienadowska, Sylwia, 2010. "Distributional implications of income tax evasion in Greece, Hungary and Italy," MPRA Paper 21465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Manos Matsaganis & Maria Flevotomou, 2010. "Distributional Implications of Tax Evasion in Greece," GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 31, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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