Managerial turnover and entrenchment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12248
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2015. "Managerial Turnover and Entrenchment," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Motivating Innovation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1823-1860, October.
- Alessandro Lizzeri & Margaret A. Meyer & Nicola Persico, 2002. "The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations," Penn CARESS Working Papers 592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c0, Penn Economics Department.
- Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2010.
"CEO Replacement Under Private Information,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 2935-2969, August.
- Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger, 2009. "CEO replacement under private information," IMFS Working Paper Series 29, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Catherine Casamatta & Alexander Guembel, 2010.
"Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2403-2436, December.
- Casamatta, Catherine & Guembel, Alexander, 2007. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia," IDEI Working Papers 442, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2014. "On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-40.
- Yermack, David, 2006.
"Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 237-256, September.
- Yermack, David, 2006. "Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs," SIFR Research Report Series 41, Institute for Financial Research.
- E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fabinger, 2013. "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 528-583.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998.
"Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Oct 1996.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Working Papers _004, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
- Bonatti, Alessandro & Hörner, Johannes, 2017.
"Career concerns with exponential learning,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Bonatti, Alessandro & Hörner, Johannes, 2017. "Career Concerns with Exponential Learning," TSE Working Papers 17-793, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Eitan Moshe Goldman & Peggy Peiju Huang, 2015. "Contractual vs. Actual Separation Pay Following CEO Turnover," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1108-1120, May.
- Anderson, Simon P. & Renault, Regis, 2003.
"Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 253-264, December.
- Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, 2001. "Effciency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition," Virginia Economics Online Papers 353, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2001. "Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition," Virginia Economics Online Papers 360, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Roman Inderst & Manuel Klein, 2007.
"Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 881-904, December.
- Inderst, Roman & Klein, Manuel, 2009. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay," IMFS Working Paper Series 33, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
- Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006.
"On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
- David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson & Johnson Graduate School of Management & Cornell University, 2004. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," Economics Series Working Papers 185, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Volker Laux, 2008. "Board Independence and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 137-171, March.
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 519-547, April.
- Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga Q., 2016. "Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 445-465.
- Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, 2012. "How Has CEO Turnover Changed?," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 12(1), pages 57-87, March.
- Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 519-548, April.
- Lucian A. Taylor, 2010. "Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2051-2087, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022. "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 9801, CESifo.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro & Ma, Xinxin & Mizobata, Satoshi, 2020.
"Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis,"
Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Iwasaki, Ichiro & Ma, Xinxin & Mizobata, Satoshi, 2019. "Corporate Ownership and Managerial Turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Meta-Analysis," CEI Working Paper Series 2019-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Ichiro Iwasaki & Xinxin Ma & Satoshi Mizobata, 2020. "Corporate Ownership and Managerial Turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Meta-Analysis," KIER Working Papers 1034, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Van Wesep, Edward D. & Wang, Sean, 2014. "The prevention of excess managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 579-593.
- Brown, Kareen & Pacharn, Parunchana & Patterson, Evelyn, 2022. "Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
- Cyrus Aghamolla & Tadashi Hashimoto, 2021. "Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 437-486, May.
- Guthrie, Graeme, 2021. "A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
- Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
- Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Weisbach, Michael S., 2013. "What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings☆☆Miriam Schwartz-Ziv is from Harvard University and Northeastern University, e-mail: miriam.schwartz@mail.huji.ac.il. Michael S. Weisb," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 349-366.
- Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia & Malenko, Nadya, 2017.
"Deadlock on the Board,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jason Roderick Donaldson & Nadya Malenko & Giorgia Piacentino, 2019. "Deadlock on the Board," NBER Working Papers 26155, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.
- Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart & Laux, Volker, 2017. "Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 253-261.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brown, Kareen & Jha, Ranjini & Pacharn, Parunchana, 2015. "Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-126.
- Lili Dai & Rui Shen & Bohui Zhang, 2021. "Does the media spotlight burn or spur innovation?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 343-390, March.
- Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2010.
"Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3028, CESifo.
- Annalisa Luporini & Clara Graziano, 2010. "Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks," Working Papers - Economics wp2010_05.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated".
"The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp713, Financial Markets Group.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2012. "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," CEPR Discussion Papers 9182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2012. "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2015.
"Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1383-1414.
- Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, 2011. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," FMG Discussion Papers dp694, Financial Markets Group.
- Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2012. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2015. "Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69539, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010.
"The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
- Renée Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2008. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," NBER Working Papers 14486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Adams, Renee & Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2009. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Working Paper Series 2008-21, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010.
"CEO Compensation,"
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
- Frydman, Carola & Jenter, Dirk, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Research Papers 2069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," NBER Working Papers 16585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3277, CESifo.
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Kukec, Sandra K. & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Board Incentives and Board Independence in Dynamic Agency," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-567, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2005. "Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021.
"The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 49-77, March.
- Foarta, Dana & Sugaya, Tukuo, 2018. "The Cost of a Bad Hire: Optimal Contracts under Selection Concerns," Research Papers 3614, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:27:y:2018:i:4:p:742-771. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.