IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v96y2006i2p62-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities

Author

Listed:
  • Isabelle Brocas
  • Kitty Chan
  • Isabelle Perrigne

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Brocas & Kitty Chan & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 62-66, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:62-66
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282806777212369
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/000282806777212369
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, Elsevier.
    2. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L., 1989. "The effects of economic regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1449-1506, Elsevier.
    3. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    4. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2018. "Market Power and the Laffer Curve," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1651-1687, September.
    2. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622963, HAL.
    3. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
    4. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-38, March.
    5. Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jerome, 2018. "Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: The case of the French rail industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 21-30.
    6. Barbosa, Alexandro & Lima, Severino Cesário de & Brusca, Isabel, 2016. "Governance and efficiency in the Brazilian water utilities: A dynamic analysis in the process of universal access," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PA), pages 82-96.
    7. Ali Yurukoglu & Claire Lim, 2014. "Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Asymmetric Information, and Political Environments," 2014 Meeting Papers 530, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Guerriero, Carmine, 2013. "The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
    9. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010. "The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts," Working Papers hal-00622961, HAL.
    11. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010. "Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-158, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
    14. Sun, Yanshuo & Gong, Hengye & Guo, Qianwen & Schonfeld, Paul & Li, Zhongfei, 2020. "Regulating a public transit monopoly under asymmetric cost information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 496-522.
    15. Haug, Peter, 2007. "Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2007, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    16. Barbosa, Alexandro & Brusca, Isabel, 2015. "Governance structures and their impact on tariff levels of Brazilian water and sanitation corporations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 94-105.
    17. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Larry Blank & John Mayo, 2009. "Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 233-255, November.
    2. Kevin Currier, 2004. "Natural monopoly regulation in the presence of cost misreporting," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(1), pages 49-61, March.
    3. Paul Joskow & Nancy Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compensation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1 Microec), pages 1-72.
    4. Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas, 2019. "Self-regulation of online platform and competition policy challenges: A case study on Go-Jek," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(1), pages 33-53, March.
    5. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    6. Lawrence White, 2002. "International Trade In Services: More Than Meets the Eye," Working Papers 02-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    7. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    8. Beitia, Arantza, 2003. "Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 1011-1036, November.
    9. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Sato, Motohiro, 2004. "An optimal contract approach to hospital financing," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 85-110, January.
    10. Gregory E. Elliehausen, 1998. "The cost of banking regulation: a review of the evidence," Staff Studies 171, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Hervé Dumez & Alain Jeunemaître, 2005. "La démarche narrative en économie," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(4), pages 983-1005.
    12. Polemis, Michael L., 2016. "New evidence on the impact of structural reforms on electricity sector performance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 420-431.
    13. Piia Pekola & Ismo Linnosmaa & Hennamari Mikkola, 2017. "Assessing the effects of price regulation and freedom of choice on quality: evidence from the physiotherapy market," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, December.
    14. Coggins, Jay S. & Smith, Vincent H., 1992. "Welfare Effects of Emission Allowance Trading in a Twice-Regulated Industry," Staff Papers 200554, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    15. Fernando Bernstein & Awi Federgruen, 2004. "A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(6), pages 868-886, December.
    16. Cassiman, Bruno, 2000. "Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 283-314, February.
    17. Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2016. "Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 93-116, March.
    18. Paul Joskow, 2005. "Regulation and Deregulation after 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Research in Industrial Organization," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(2), pages 169-193, December.
    19. Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2020. "Delegation of Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 445-482, September.
    20. Correa, Paulo & Melo, Marcus & Mueller, Bernardo & Pereira, Carlos, 2008. "Regulatory governance in Brazilian infrastructure industries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 202-216, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:62-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.