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Content
2012, Volume 76, Issue 1
- 195-209 Competition fosters trust
by Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 210-225 Non-Bayesian social learning
by Jadbabaie, Ali & Molavi, Pooya & Sandroni, Alvaro & Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
- 226-248 Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
by Kirkegaard, René
- 249-271 Political competition between differentiated candidates
by Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 272-284 Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
by Man, Priscilla T.Y.
- 285-300 Strategy-proof partitioning
by Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik
- 301-328 Competing conventions
by Neary, Philip R.
- 329-339 Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
by Sun, Yeneng & Wu, Lei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 340-343 A correction to “Large games and the law of large numbers” [Games Econom. Behav. 64 (2008) 1–34]
by Tolvanen, Juha & Soultanis, Elefterios
- 344-348 Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
by van den Brink, René
- 349-353 Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
by Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan
2012, Volume 75, Issue 2
- 449-463 Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study
by Agranov, Marina & Potamites, Elizabeth & Schotter, Andrew & Tergiman, Chloe
- 464-480 Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
by Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 481-489 Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity
by Baillon, Aurélien & Driesen, Bram & Wakker, Peter P.
- 490-509 Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
- 510-517 A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games
by Blume, Andreas
- 518-537 Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
by Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
- 538-554 Stochastic stability in best shot network games
by Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo
- 555-569 Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests
by Breitmoser, Yves
- 570-586 Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment
by Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria
- 587-597 A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
by Chen, Yi-Chun
- 598-612 Transparency, complementarity and holdout
by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal
- 613-624 What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals
by Condorelli, Daniele
- 625-638 A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
by Dominiak, Adam & Duersch, Peter & Lefort, Jean-Philippe
- 639-645 Testing substitutability
by Hatfield, John William & Immorlica, Nicole & Kominers, Scott Duke
- 646-667 Deliberative democracy and electoral competition
by Hummel, Patrick
- 668-684 Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
by Jara-Moroni, Pedro
- 685-693 School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
by Kojima, Fuhito
- 694-713 The efficiency and stability of R&D networks
by König, Michael D. & Battiston, Stefano & Napoletano, Mauro & Schweitzer, Frank
- 714-730 On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
by Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 731-751 Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
by Lebrun, Bernard
- 752-775 Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
by Lelarge, Marc
- 776-787 Influence networks
by López-Pintado, Dunia
- 788-808 Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
by Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S.
- 809-831 Comparative statics of altruism and spite
by Milchtaich, Igal
- 832-841 A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism
by Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Roemer, John E.
- 842-854 Coalitional stochastic stability
by Newton, Jonathan
- 855-866 Mean and variance responsive learning
by Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv
- 867-881 The influence relation for ternary voting games
by Parker, Cameron
- 882-897 Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
by Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton
- 898-920 Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz
- 921-935 Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
by Spiliopoulos, Leonidas
- 936-947 Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
by Troyan, Peter
- 948-963 Let them cheat!
by Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William
- 964-983 Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
by Zhao, Rui R.
- 984-989 On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
by Kominers, Scott Duke
- 990-999 On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
by Lamy, Laurent
- 1000-1008 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
by Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 1009-1013 Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
by Suzuki, Toru
- 1014-1024 Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
by Weidenholzer, Simon
2012, Volume 75, Issue 1
- 1-16 Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
by Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai
- 17-34 Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory
by Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian
- 35-52 Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
by Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion
- 53-66 Potential competition in preemption games
by Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas
- 67-80 Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias
by Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J.
- 81-103 From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 104-119 Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
by Daley, Brendan & Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin
- 120-138 Oligopolistic competition in price and quality
by Dubovik, Andrei & Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- 139-151 Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms
by Friedman, Eric J.
- 152-167 Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem
by Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio
- 168-184 Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
by Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire
- 185-197 Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
by Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien
- 198-216 Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu
- 217-232 Profit-maximizing matchmaker
by Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo
- 233-249 Communication and efficiency in auctions
by Kos, Nenad
- 250-264 Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment
by Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J.
- 265-276 Forward induction equilibrium
by Man, Priscilla T.Y.
- 277-282 Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample
by Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis
- 283-298 Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach
by Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava
- 299-318 Evolution of theories of mind
by Mohlin, Erik
- 319-336 Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
by Non, Arjan
- 337-353 Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
by Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 354-371 Learning in games with risky payoffs
by Shafran, Aric P.
- 372-401 Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
by Staudigl, Mathias
- 402-412 A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
by Trudeau, Christian
- 413-423 Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 424-427 Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
by Fey, Mark
- 428-434 Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
by Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro
- 435-440 Two-person ex post implementation
by Ohashi, Yoshihiro
- 441-447 Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
by Shimoji, Makoto
2012, Volume 74, Issue 2
- 447-469 The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
by Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep
- 470-485 Buyer groups as strategic commitments
by Dana, James D.
- 486-503 Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam
- 504-516 Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters
by Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue
- 517-525 How common are common priors?
by Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov
- 526-540 All-pay war
by Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi
- 541-560 Authority and communication in the laboratory
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung
- 561-575 Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
by Lu, Jingfeng
- 576-587 When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
by Manjunath, Vikram
- 588-600 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
- 601-619 Learning across games
by Mengel, Friederike
- 620-636 Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
by Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael & Wang, Jun
- 637-650 Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
by Sano, Ryuji
- 651-665 The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas
- 666-686 Optimal auctions with information acquisition
by Shi, Xianwen
- 687-698 On the accessibility of core-extensions
by Yang, Yi-You
- 699-708 A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
by Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin
- 709-713 Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties
by Wichardt, Philipp C.
2012, Volume 74, Issue 1
- 1-11 Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach
by Andreozzi, Luciano
- 12-31 Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study
by Bednar, Jenna & Chen, Yan & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Page, Scott
- 32-51 Raising juveniles
by Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T.
- 52-67 Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
by Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha
- 68-82 The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
by Cheikbossian, Guillaume
- 83-101 Dynamic coordination with individual learning
by Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin
- 102-119 Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection
by Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex
- 120-143 Minimum cost arborescences
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Mishra, Debasis
- 144-153 Bargaining with revoking costs
by Dutta, Rohan
- 154-169 Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava
- 170-183 When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
by Faravelli, Marco & Stanca, Luca
- 184-207 Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael
- 208-221 Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
by Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O.
- 222-234 Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan
- 243-256 Stochastic games with information lag
by Levy, Yehuda
- 257-268 The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
by Mandler, Michael
- 269-284 Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma
by Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira
- 285-298 Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust
by McEvily, Bill & Radzevick, Joseph R. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 299-310 Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
by Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo
- 311-320 Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 321-331 On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
by Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier
- 332-351 The strategic value of recall
by Peretz, Ron
- 352-365 The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
by Silvers, Randy
- 366-381 Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence
by Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark
- 382-393 Robustness against indirect invasions
by van Veelen, Matthijs
- 394-398 Group robust stability in matching markets
by Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa
- 399-406 The Herodotus paradox
by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G.
- 407-417 Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
by Bozbay, Irem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans
- 418-430 Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games
by Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad
- 431-433 Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
by Chameni Nembua, C.
- 434-441 Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics
by Hommes, Cars H. & Ochea, Marius I.
- 442-446 Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures
by Xiong, Siyang
2011, Volume 73, Issue 2
- 301-309 Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
by Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan
- 310-317 Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
by Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee
- 318-344 Match-fixing under competitive odds
by Bag, Parimal Kanti & Saha, Bibhas
- 345-359 Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
by Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo
- 360-374 Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
by Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto
- 375-387 Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael
- 388-401 Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations
by Comino, Stefano & Manenti, Fabio M. & Nicolò, Antonio
- 402-428 Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment
by de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph
- 429-451 Overconfidence and moral hazard
by de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique
- 452-458 Generalized Raiffa solutions
by Diskin, A. & Koppel, M. & Samet, D.
- 459-478 The framing of games and the psychology of play
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
- 479-495 Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
by Fibich, Gadi & Gavish, Nir
- 496-506 Second best efficiency and the English auction
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio
- 507-516 Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan
- 517-537 Voronoi languages
by Jäger, Gerhard & Metzger, Lars P. & Riedel, Frank
- 538-552 Investment incentives in bilateral trading
by Lau, Stephanie
- 553-563 Assignment markets with the same core
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles
- 564-572 The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
by Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 573-594 The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment
by Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep
- 595-607 Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
by Wolitzky, Alexander
- 608-614 Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales
by Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi
- 615-621 Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
September 2011, Volume 73, Issue 1
- 1-16 Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena
- 17-38 Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements
by Anshelevich, Elliot & Shepherd, F.B. & Wilfong, Gordon
- 39-51 Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
by Atlamaz, Murat & Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
- 52-64 Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
by Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise
- 65-75 Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
by Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara
- 76-90 Network architecture, salience and coordination
by Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas
- 91-110 Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty
by Cooper, David J. & Rege, Mari
- 111-135 Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
by Eguia, Jon X.
- 136-146 Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game
by Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Ponti, Giovanni & Vega-Redondo, Fernando
- 147-166 English auctions with resale: An experimental study
by Georganas, Sotiris
- 167-185 Aggregate information cascades
by Guarino, Antonio & Harmgart, Heike & Huck, Steffen
- 186-199 Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 200-214 The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice
by Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C.
- 215-226 Inequality and network structure
by Kets, Willemien & Iyengar, Garud & Sethi, Rajiv & Bowles, Samuel
- 227-235 Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application
by Okada, Akira
- 236-243 Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
by Said, Maher
- 244-261 Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness
by Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan
- 262-286 Fictitious play in 3x3 games: Chaos and dithering behaviour
by van Strien, Sebastian & Sparrow, Colin
- 287-295 On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
by Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D.
- 296-300 Choosing and sharing
by Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin
June 2011, Volume 72, Issue 2
- 321-338 A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
by Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans Theo
- 339-360 Social interactions and spillovers
by Cabrales, Antonio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves
- 361-375 Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game
by Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei
- 376-399 Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study
by Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita
- 400-426 Social distance in a virtual world experiment
by Fiedler, Marina & Haruvy, Ernan & Li, Sherry Xin
- 427-438 On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road
by Granot, Daniel & Hamers, Herbert & Kuipers, Jeroen & Maschler, Michael
- 439-447 Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence
by Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo & Ponti, Giovanni & Tomás, Josefa & Ubeda, Luis
- 448-451 Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment
by Kotowski, Maciej H.
- 452-466 On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
by Kuzmics, Christoph
- 467-484 On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
by Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés
- 485-509 Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
by Morton, Rebecca B. & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 510-525 An algorithm for proper rationalizability
by Perea, Andrés
- 526-543 One-dimensional bargaining
by Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 544-557 Bilateral trading with naive traders
by Saran, Rene
- 558-573 An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
by Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John
- 574-582 Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
by Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung
- 583-585 On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
by Hall, Nicholas G. & Liu, Zhixin
- 586-593 Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
by Hummel, Patrick
- 594-601 Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note
by Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel
- 602-606 Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
by Sano, Ryuji
May 2011, Volume 72, Issue 1
- 1-11 Derandomization of auctions
by Aggarwal, Gagan & Fiat, Amos & Goldberg, Andrew V. & Hartline, Jason D. & Immorlica, Nicole & Sudan, Madhu
- 12-29 Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
by Bade, Sophie
- 30-37 Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
by Berger, Ulrich
- 38-45 Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan
- 46-76 Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes
by Casella, Alessandra
- 77-85 Gender differences in cooperation with group membership
by Charness, Gary & Rustichini, Aldo