This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Elsevier Games and Economic Behavior Contact information of
Elsevier: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Download restrictions: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only Editor:
For technical questions regarding this series, please contact
(Heidi Boesdal) Series handle: repec:eee:gamebe
More pages of listings: 0 |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6
1995, Volume 11, Issue 2
1995, Volume 11, Issue 1 1995, Volume 10, Issue 2 1995, Volume 10, Issue 1 1995, Volume 9, Issue 2 1995, Volume 9, Issue 1 1994, Volume 7, Issue 3 1994, Volume 7, Issue 2 1994, Volume 7, Issue 1 1994, Volume 6, Issue 3 1994, Volume 6, Issue 2 1994, Volume 6, Issue 1 1993, Volume 5, Issue 4 509-513 Adaptive Dynamics, Part II by Crawford Vincent P. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games by Farrell Joseph [Downloadable! (restricted)]
532-546 Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability by Warneryd Karl [Downloadable! (restricted)]
547-575 Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication by Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel [Downloadable! (restricted)]
576-603 On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment by Ben-Porath Elchanan & Dekel Eddie & Rustichini Aldo [Downloadable! (restricted)]
604-617 Evolution of Smartn Players by Stahl Dale O. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
618-631 Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example by Vega-Redondo Fernando [Downloadable! (restricted)]
632-646 Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability by Evans George W. & Guesnerie Roger [Downloadable! (restricted)]
647-651 The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, By Brian Skyrms, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 199 pp., $32.50 by Bicchieri Cristina [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1993, Volume 5, Issue 3 1993, Volume 5, Issue 2 1993, Volume 5, Issue 1 1992, Volume 4, Issue 4 493-510 It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
511-527 Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers by Kaneko, Mamoru & Kimura, Toshiyuki [Downloadable! (restricted)]
528-552 The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form by Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod [Downloadable! (restricted)]
553-564 The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria by Mertens, Jean-Francois [Downloadable! (restricted)]
565-581 Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games by Moldovanu, Benny [Downloadable! (restricted)]
582-587 The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value by Owen, Guillermo & Winter, Eyal [Downloadable! (restricted)]
588-605 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmuller, Joachim [Downloadable! (restricted)]
606-626 Credible assignments in coordination games by Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
627-649 Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule by von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1992, Volume 4, Issue 3 327-346 Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R& D game with private information by Aoki, Reiko & Reitman, David [Downloadable! (restricted)]
347-372 A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
373-401 Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem by Moulin, Herve [Downloadable! (restricted)]
402-421 Coalition formation under limited communication by Rosenthal, Edward C. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
422-425 Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes by Seidmann, Daniel J. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
426-449 Folk theorems in overlapping generations games by Smith, Lones [Downloadable! (restricted)]
450-462 On self-enforcement in extensive-form games by Weibull, Jorgen W. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
463-483 Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information by Wettstein, David [Downloadable! (restricted)]
484-492 On nash implementation of social choice correspondences by Yamato, Takehiko [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1992, Volume 4, Issue 2 169-181 A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining by Asheim, Geir B. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
182-201 Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures by Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John [Downloadable! (restricted)]
202-217 The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games by Jordan, J. S. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
218-231 Equilibrium refinement in psychological games by Kolpin, Van [Downloadable! (restricted)]
232-251 Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers by Peleg, B. & Shmida, A. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
252-260 Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games by Peters, Hans [Downloadable! (restricted)]
261-283 Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis by Rapoport, Amnon & Boebel, Richard B. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
284-313 Dominated strategies and common knowledge by Samuelson, Larry [Downloadable! (restricted)]
314-317 Game theory : By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 608 pp., $35.00 by Wilson, Charles A. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1992, Volume 4, Issue 1 1-17 On being honest and behaving honestly by Adler, Moshe [Downloadable! (restricted)]
18-36 Imperfect equilibrium by Beja, Avraham [Downloadable! (restricted)]
37-57 Risk sharing with competition by Biglaiser, Gary [Downloadable! (restricted)]
58-71 Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game by Borm, P. E. M. & Tijs, S. H. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
72-100 Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games by DeMarzo, Peter M. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
101-121 The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games by Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip [Downloadable! (restricted)]
122-131 On platers with a bounded number of states by Papadimitriou, Christos H. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
132-144 The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure by Winter, Eyal [Downloadable! (restricted)]
145-160 The hybrid solutions of an N-person game by Zhao, Jingang [Downloadable! (restricted)]
161-165 Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis : By Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 265 + xiii pp., $54.50 (hardback) by Rothblum, Uriel G. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1991, Volume 3, Issue 4 393-402 Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games by Brown, Murray & Chiang, Shin-Hwan & Yamamoto, Kenji [Downloadable! (restricted)]
403-422 Constrained egalitarian allocations by Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj [Downloadable! (restricted)]
423-437 Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility by Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel [Downloadable! (restricted)]
438-452 Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions by Heijmans, Johannes G. C. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
453-466 Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers by Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben [Downloadable! (restricted)]
467-486 Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders by Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter [Downloadable! (restricted)]
487-503 The core of an m-sided assignment game by Quint, Thomas [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1991, Volume 3, Issue 3 267-277 Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms by Abdou, Joseph [Downloadable! (restricted)]
278-294 Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games by Asheim, Geir B. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
295-322 Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study by Binmore, Ken & Morgan, Peter & Snaked, Avner & Sutton, John [Downloadable! (restricted)]
323-338 Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization by Kamien, Morton I. & Zang, Israel [Downloadable! (restricted)]
339-349 Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information by Nakayama, Mikio & Quintas, Luis [Downloadable! (restricted)]
350-355 The positive value of information by Neyman, Abraham [Downloadable! (restricted)]
356-367 Pure-strategy [epsiv]-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games by Radzik, Tadeusz [Downloadable! (restricted)]
368-384 The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor by Stahl, Dale II [Downloadable! (restricted)]
385-387 Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable number of agents : By W. Thomson and T. Lensberg, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. 230 pp., $39.50 by Moulin, Herve [Downloadable! (restricted)]
387-391 Game theory: Analysis of conflict : By Roger B. Myerson, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 568 pp., $45.00 by Kalai, Ehud [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1991, Volume 3, Issue 2 157-162 A note on equalization in extensive form games by Bergantino, Gustavo & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio [Downloadable! (restricted)]
163-182 The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem by Granot, Daniel & Rothblum, Uriel G. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
183-220 Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard [Downloadable! (restricted)]
221-236 Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing by Ponssard, Jean-Pierre [Downloadable! (restricted)]
237-243 A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities by Rosenthal, Robert W. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
244-259 A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players by Salant, David J. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
260-264 Bargaining and markets : By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. ISBN 0-12-528631-7, xi + 216 pp., $14.95 Paper, $34.50 hardbound by Binmore, Ken [Downloadable! (restricted)]
1991, Volume 3, Issue 1 3-24 Evolution, learning, and economic behavior by Selten, Reinhard [Downloadable! (restricted)]
25-59 An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination by Crawford, Vincent P. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
60-81 Bayesian learning in normal form games by Jordan, J. S. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John [Downloadable! (restricted)]
101-109 Viscous population equilibria by Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M. [Downloadable! (restricted)]
0 |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 Access
and download statistics
Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service .
This page was last updated on 2008-9-28.
IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .