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Games and Economic Behavior
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2012, Volume 75, Issue 1
- 319-336 Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
by Non, Arjan - 337-353 Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
by Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun - 354-371 Learning in games with risky payoffs
by Shafran, Aric P. - 372-401 Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
by Staudigl, Mathias - 402-412 A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
by Trudeau, Christian - 413-423 Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David - 424-427 Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
by Fey, Mark - 428-434 Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
by Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro - 435-440 Two-person ex post implementation
by Ohashi, Yoshihiro - 441-447 Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
by Shimoji, Makoto
2012, Volume 74, Issue 2
- 447-469 The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
by Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep - 470-485 Buyer groups as strategic commitments
by Dana, James D. - 486-503 Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam - 504-516 Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters
by Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue - 517-525 How common are common priors?
by Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov - 526-540 All-pay war
by Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi - 541-560 Authority and communication in the laboratory
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung - 561-575 Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
by Lu, Jingfeng - 576-587 When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
by Manjunath, Vikram - 588-600 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - 601-619 Learning across games
by Mengel, Friederike - 620-636 Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
by Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael & Wang, Jun - 637-650 Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
by Sano, Ryuji - 651-665 The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - 666-686 Optimal auctions with information acquisition
by Shi, Xianwen - 687-698 On the accessibility of core-extensions
by Yang, Yi-You - 699-708 A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
by Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin - 709-713 Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties
by Wichardt, Philipp C.
2012, Volume 74, Issue 1
- 1-11 Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach
by Andreozzi, Luciano - 12-31 Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study
by Bednar, Jenna & Chen, Yan & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Page, Scott - 32-51 Raising juveniles
by Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T. - 52-67 Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
by Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha - 68-82 The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
by Cheikbossian, Guillaume - 83-101 Dynamic coordination with individual learning
by Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin - 102-119 Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection
by Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex - 120-143 Minimum cost arborescences
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Mishra, Debasis - 144-153 Bargaining with revoking costs
by Dutta, Rohan - 154-169 Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - 170-183 When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
by Faravelli, Marco & Stanca, Luca - 184-207 Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael - 208-221 Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
by Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O. - 222-234 Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan - 243-256 Stochastic games with information lag
by Levy, Yehuda - 257-268 The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
by Mandler, Michael - 269-284 Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma
by Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira - 285-298 Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust
by McEvily, Bill & Radzevick, Joseph R. & Weber, Roberto A. - 299-310 Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
by Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo - 311-320 Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
by Norman, Thomas W.L. - 321-331 On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
by Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier - 332-351 The strategic value of recall
by Peretz, Ron - 352-365 The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
by Silvers, Randy - 366-381 Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence
by Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark - 382-393 Robustness against indirect invasions
by van Veelen, Matthijs - 394-398 Group robust stability in matching markets
by Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa - 399-406 The Herodotus paradox
by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G. - 407-417 Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
by Bozbay, Irem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans - 418-430 Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games
by Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad - 431-433 Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
by Chameni Nembua, C. - 434-441 Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics
by Hommes, Cars H. & Ochea, Marius I. - 442-446 Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures
by Xiong, Siyang
2011, Volume 73, Issue 2
- 301-309 Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
by Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan - 310-317 Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
by Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee - 318-344 Match-fixing under competitive odds
by Bag, Parimal Kanti & Saha, Bibhas - 345-359 Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
by Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo - 360-374 Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
by Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto - 375-387 Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael - 388-401 Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations
by Comino, Stefano & Manenti, Fabio M. & Nicolò, Antonio - 402-428 Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment
by de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph - 429-451 Overconfidence and moral hazard
by de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique - 452-458 Generalized Raiffa solutions
by Diskin, A. & Koppel, M. & Samet, D. - 459-478 The framing of games and the psychology of play
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - 479-495 Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
by Fibich, Gadi & Gavish, Nir - 496-506 Second best efficiency and the English auction
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - 507-516 Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan - 517-537 Voronoi languages
by Jäger, Gerhard & Metzger, Lars P. & Riedel, Frank - 538-552 Investment incentives in bilateral trading
by Lau, Stephanie - 553-563 Assignment markets with the same core
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - 564-572 The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
by Ryvkin, Dmitry - 573-594 The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment
by Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep - 595-607 Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
by Wolitzky, Alexander - 608-614 Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales
by Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi - 615-621 Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
2011, Volume 73, Issue 1
- 1-16 Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena - 17-38 Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements
by Anshelevich, Elliot & Shepherd, F.B. & Wilfong, Gordon - 39-51 Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
by Atlamaz, Murat & Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries - 52-64 Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
by Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise - 65-75 Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
by Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara - 76-90 Network architecture, salience and coordination
by Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas - 91-110 Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty
by Cooper, David J. & Rege, Mari - 111-135 Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
by Eguia, Jon X. - 136-146 Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game
by Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Ponti, Giovanni & Vega-Redondo, Fernando - 147-166 English auctions with resale: An experimental study
by Georganas, Sotiris - 167-185 Aggregate information cascades
by Guarino, Antonio & Harmgart, Heike & Huck, Steffen - 186-199 Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W. - 200-214 The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice
by Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C. - 215-226 Inequality and network structure
by Kets, Willemien & Iyengar, Garud & Sethi, Rajiv & Bowles, Samuel - 227-235 Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application
by Okada, Akira - 236-243 Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
by Said, Maher - 244-261 Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness
by Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan - 262-286 Fictitious play in 3x3 games: Chaos and dithering behaviour
by van Strien, Sebastian & Sparrow, Colin - 287-295 On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
by Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D. - 296-300 Choosing and sharing
by Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin
2011, Volume 72, Issue 2
- 321-338 A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
by Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans Theo - 339-360 Social interactions and spillovers
by Cabrales, Antonio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves - 361-375 Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game
by Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei - 376-399 Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study
by Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita - 400-426 Social distance in a virtual world experiment
by Fiedler, Marina & Haruvy, Ernan & Li, Sherry Xin - 427-438 On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road
by Granot, Daniel & Hamers, Herbert & Kuipers, Jeroen & Maschler, Michael - 439-447 Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence
by Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo & Ponti, Giovanni & Tomás, Josefa & Ubeda, Luis - 448-451 Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment
by Kotowski, Maciej H. - 452-466 On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
by Kuzmics, Christoph - 467-484 On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
by Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés - 485-509 Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
by Morton, Rebecca B. & Tyran, Jean-Robert - 510-525 An algorithm for proper rationalizability
by Perea, Andrés - 526-543 One-dimensional bargaining
by Predtetchinski, Arkadi - 544-557 Bilateral trading with naive traders
by Saran, Rene - 558-573 An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
by Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John - 574-582 Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
by Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung - 583-585 On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
by Hall, Nicholas G. & Liu, Zhixin - 586-593 Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
by Hummel, Patrick - 594-601 Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note
by Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel - 602-606 Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
by Sano, Ryuji
2011, Volume 72, Issue 1
- 1-11 Derandomization of auctions
by Aggarwal, Gagan & Fiat, Amos & Goldberg, Andrew V. & Hartline, Jason D. & Immorlica, Nicole & Sudan, Madhu - 12-29 Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
by Bade, Sophie - 30-37 Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
by Berger, Ulrich - 38-45 Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan - 46-76 Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes
by Casella, Alessandra - 77-85 Gender differences in cooperation with group membership
by Charness, Gary & Rustichini, Aldo - 86-99 Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
by Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech - 100-122 How to talk to multiple audiences
by Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory - 123-138 Influence functions, followers and command games
by Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka - 139-148 The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions
by Gresik, Thomas A. - 149-162 Centralizing information in networks
by Hagenbach, Jeanne - 163-171 Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
by Hellman, Ziv - 172-186 Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
by Klaus, Bettina - 187-201 Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
by Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju - 202-217 Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication
by Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 218-241 Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
by Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M. - 242-254 Group strategyproofness in queueing models
by Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh - 255-270 Intertemporal choice and the magnitude effect
by Noor, Jawwad - 271-287 Potential games in volatile environments
by Staudigl, Mathias - 288-300 Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
by Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet - 301-305 A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
by Di Tillio, Alfredo - 306-313 Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
by Matsumura, Toshihiro & Matsushima, Noriaki - 314-320 Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints
by Moulin, Herve & Laigret, Francois
2011, Volume 71, Issue 2
- 235-245 Union-firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency
by Appelbaum, Elie - 246-260 Ambiguous act equilibria
by Bade, Sophie - 261-281 Robust implementation in general mechanisms
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen - 282-303 Trust and trustworthiness in networked exchange
by Cassar, Alessandra & Rigdon, Mary - 304-314 On the coincidence property
by Chang, Chih & Tseng, Ying-Chih - 315-327 Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
by Chien, Steve & Sinclair, Alistair - 328-338 The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
by Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert - 339-350 The insider's curse
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael - 351-365 Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
by Huck, Steffen & Jehiel, Philippe & Rutter, Tom - 366-394 Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: An experimental study
by Ivanov, Asen - 395-408 Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
by Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J. - 409-419 Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
by Sher, Itai - 420-435 The monoclus of a coalitional game
by Slikker, Marco & Norde, Henk - 436-455 Correlated equilibria in continuous games: Characterization and computation
by Stein, Noah D. & Parrilo, Pablo A. & Ozdaglar, Asuman - 456-478 Non-parametric test of time consistency: Present bias and future bias
by Takeuchi, Kan - 479-486 Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
by Tang, Pingzhong & Lin, Fangzhen - 487-502 Equilibrium play in matches: Binary Markov games
by Walker, Mark & Wooders, John & Amir, Rabah - 503-512 Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
by Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady - 513-520 Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
by Kamishiro, Yusuke - 521-526 Equilibrium joining probabilities for an M/G/1 queue
by Kerner, Yoav - 527-533 Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
by Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H. - 534-538 Julio González-Díaz, Ignacio García-Jurado and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, An Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory , Graduate Studies in Mathematics vol. 115, American Mathematical Society (2010) ISBN 978-0-8218-5151-7 xiii+324 pages
by Voorneveld, Mark
2011, Volume 71, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editorial: A special issue dedicated to John Nash
by Dixit, Avinash & Kalai, Ehud & Morris, Stephen - 2-5 Commentary: Nash's work in economics
by Binmore, Ken - 6-8 Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics
by Hart, Sergiu - 9-11 Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design
by Maskin, Eric - 12-13 Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory
by Young, H. Peyton - 14-22 Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
by Anbarci, Nejat & Boyd III, John H. - 23-48 On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
by Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol - 49-65 A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism
by Cárceles-Poveda, Eva & Tauman, Yair - 66-87 No trade
by Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - 88-99 Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: Framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
by Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel - 100-120 Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
by Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru - 121-140 Perfect implementation
by Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio - 141-173 Action-Graph Games
by Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin & Bhat, Navin A.R. - 174-192 Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
by Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech - 193-211 Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics
by Rota Bulò, Samuel & Bomze, Immanuel M. - 212-223 A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
by Schmutzler, Armin - 224-234 High profit equilibria in directed search models
by Virág, Gábor
2010, Volume 70, Issue 2
- 194-227 Spread of (mis)information in social networks
by Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali - 228-241 Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?
by Anctil, Regina M. & Dickhaut, John & Johnson, Cathleen & Kanodia, Chandra - 242-260 Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
by Aoyagi, Masaki - 261-270 Only a dictatorship is efficient
by Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A. - 271-288 Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation
by Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent - 289-303 Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis
by Dhaene, Geert & Bouckaert, Jan - 304-324 Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information
by Eliaz, Kfir & Schotter, Andrew - 325-353 Credit cards and inflation
by Geanakoplos, John & Dubey, Pradeep - 354-374 Indirect reciprocity and money
by Hens, Thorsten & Vogt, Bodo - 375-391 A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
by Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - 392-402 Monotonicity of social welfare optima
by Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter - 403-424 Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence
by Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam - 425-445 On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
by Hummel, Patrick - 446-456 Decompositions and potentials for normal form games
by Sandholm, William H. - 457-471 A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
by Taylor, Curtis R. & Yildirim, Huseyin - 472-487 Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
by Wichardt, Philipp C.