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RAND Journal of Economics

Contact information of RAND Corporation:
Postal: 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138
Phone: 310-393-0411
Fax: 310-393-4818
Email:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
More information through EDIRC

This journal used to be published by The RAND Corporation under the name RAND Journal of Economics.

This journal used to be published by The RAND Corporation under the name Bell Journal of Economics.
Order information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
Editor: James Hosek
For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum)
Series handle: repec:bla:randje
Citations RSS feed: at CitEc
Impact factors: Simple, Recursive, Discounted, Recursive discounted, H-Index, Aggregate
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946-963 To bundle or not to bundle
by Hanming Fang & Peter Norman
964-982 Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters
by Peter Davis
983-1005 Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment
by Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato
1005-1022 An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds
by Artyom Shneyerov

483-502 Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms)
by Dan Bernhardt & Christopher P. Chambers
503-520 Delegating management to experts
by Chifeng Dai & Tracy R. Lewis & Giuseppe Lopomo
521-542 Internal promotion competitions in firms
by Jed DeVaro
543-561 Sales and consumer inventory
by Igal Hendel & Aviv Nevo
562-582 The benefits of extended liability
by Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort
583-601 Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly
by Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt
602-618 The role of firm characteristics in pharmaceutical product launches
by Margaret K. Kyle
619-640 An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product‐type choices
by Katja Seim
643-644 Introduction
by Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole
645-667 Two‐sided markets: a progress report
by Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole
668-691 Competition in two‐sided markets
by Mark Armstrong
692-719 Your network or mine? The economics of routing rules
by Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz
720-737 Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms
by Andrei Hagiu
738-761 Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry
by Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran

235-256 Explaining the distribution of firm growth rates
by Giulio Bottazzi & Angelo Secchi
257-275 Using price distributions to estimate search costs
by Han Hong & Matthew Shum
276-299 Ownership, incentives, and the hold‐up problem
by Tim Baldenius
300-323 Markets, torts, and social inefficiency
by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum
324-340 Coordinating on lower prices: pharmaceutical pricing under political pressure
by Sara Fisher Ellison & Catherine Wolfram
341-361 Reputation and turnover
by Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi
362-375 Monopoly with resale
by Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan
376-390 Optimal incentives for sequential production processes
by Eyal Winter
391-415 Budget or target: the choice between input and output strategies
by Nolan H. Miller & Amit I. Pazgal
416-430 Store characteristics in retail oligopoly
by Howard Smith
431-448 Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability
by Robert Gary‐Bobo & Yossi Spiegel
449-465 Price‐matching guarantees
by Sridhar Moorthy & Ralph A. Winter
466-482 Estimating a continuous hedonic‐choice model with an application to demand for soft drinks
by Tat Y. Chan

1-22 Partnership dissolution with interdependent values
by Philippe Jehiel & Ady Pauzner
23-46 Designing electricity auctions
by Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord
47-69 Predation and its rate of return: the sugar industry, 1887–1914
by David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin
70-80 Sequential auctions: theory and evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange
by Val E. Lambson & Norman K Thurston
81-99 Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
by David Gilo & Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel
100-120 Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence
by Illoong Kwon
121-133 Damaged durable goods
by Jong‐Hee Hahn
134-145 Cooperative investments induced by contract law
by Urs Schweizer
146-154 Aggressive leaders
by Federico Etro
155-175 Reputational cheap talk
by Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen
176-194 Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?
by Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh
195-211 Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet
by David H. Reiley
212-233 National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly
by Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sørgard