This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Citations for "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy" by Stephen Williamson & Cheng Wang
For a complete description of this item, click here .
Cited by (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.): Alvarez-Parra, Fernando A. & Sanchez, Juan M., 2006.
"Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with a Hidden Labor Market ,"
MPRA Paper
2531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2008.
"Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits ,"
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
191, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology).
[Downloadable!]
Ramon Marimon & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1997.
"Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits ,"
NBER Working Papers
6038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998.
"Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits ,"
Seminar Papers
661, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
[Downloadable!] Ramon Marimon & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1997.
"Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits ,"
Economics Working Papers
211, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!] Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999.
"Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 266-91, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) David Card & Raj Chetty & Andrea Weber, 2006.
"Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market ,"
NBER Working Papers
12639, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1997.
"The Optimal Dole with Risk Aversion, Job Destruction, and Worker Heterogeneity ,"
Staff Working Papers
97-47, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andreas Pollak, 2004.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels ,"
Labor and Demography
0409004, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Robert J. Shiller, 1997.
"Expanding the Scope of Individual Risk Management: Moral Hazard and Other Behavioral Considerations ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1145, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2004.
"On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation ,"
Working papers
2004-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999.
"Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating ,"
Working Papers
99-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002.
"Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating ,"
Staff General Research Papers
10133, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002.
"Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003.
"Unemployment insurance and training in an equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents ,"
Discussion Papers
2003001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
[Downloadable!]
Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003.
"Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research ,"
Working Paper Series
2003:5, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2003.
"Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003.
"Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research ,"
Working Paper Series
2003:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006.
"Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research ,"
Journal of Economic Surveys ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Nicola Pavoni & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005.
"Optimal welfare-to-work programs ,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
143, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Pavoni, Nicola & Violante, Giovanni L, 2006.
"Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Nicola Pavoni & Violante, 2007.
"Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318, 01.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1998.
"Voting on Unemployment Insurance Generosity ,"
Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers
64, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
[Downloadable!]
Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1997.
"Moral Hazard and Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Heterogeneous Skills ,"
Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers
54, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
[Downloadable!]
Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 1998.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium ,"
Working Paper Series
1998:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B., 1998.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium ,"
Papers
1998-2, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-99, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005.
"Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000450, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2004.
"Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing ,"
NBER Working Papers
10792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006.
"Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 257-279, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Burkhard Heer, 2000.
"Employment And Welfare Effects Of A Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System ,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2000
3, Society for Computational Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Heer, Burkhard, 2000.
"Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Heer, Burkhard, 2003.
"Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System ,"
International Tax and Public Finance ,
Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 147-68, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Burkhard Heer, 2003.
"Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System ,"
Asia-Pacific Financial Markets ,
Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 147-168, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006.
"Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Robert Shimer & Iván Werning, 2005.
"Liquidity and insurance for the unemployed ,"
Staff Report
366, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Christopher A. Pissarides, 2002.
"Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts ,"
CEP Discussion Papers
0542, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Hans H. Glismann & Klaus Schrader, 2001.
"Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung Das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs ,"
Kiel Working Papers
1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
[Downloadable!]
Reichling, Felix, 2006.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Labor Market Equilibrium when Workers can Self-Insure ,"
MPRA Paper
5362, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Oct 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999.
"Assurance chômage et sociétés ,"
Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM
9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
[Downloadable!]
Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999.
"Heterogeneous Labor Markets and the Generosity Towards the Unemployed: An International Perspective ,"
Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers
88, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
[Downloadable!]
Pissarides, Christopher, 2002.
"Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Employment Contracts ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3367, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mora, José V. Rodriguez & Hassler, John, .
"Unemployment Insurance Design: inducing moving and retraining ,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
0702, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components .
This page was last updated on 2008-11-26.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .