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Citations for "A Theory of Conservatism"

by Hao Li

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  1. Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009. "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
  2. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm351, Yale School of Management.
  3. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2008. "Biased Motivation of Experts: Should They be Aggressive or Conservative?," CARF F-Series CARF-F-133, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  5. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0341, Econometric Society.
  6. Wolfgang R. Köhler, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012. "On the optimal number of representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 419-445, December.
  8. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
  9. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  10. Junichiro Ishida, 2009. "Why Hierarchy? Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," ISER Discussion Paper 0751, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  11. Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
  12. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  13. Christian Bruns, 2013. "Elections and Market Provision of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4091, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2011. "Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Participative Decision Making," Working Papers 11-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  15. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kartik, Navin, 2006. "Opinion as Incentives," MPRA Paper 6094, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Nov 2007.
  16. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Abstention, ideology and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 871-902.
  18. Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2008. "Biased Motivation of Experts: Should They be Aggressive or Conservative?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-585, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  19. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.