Citations for "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts"
by Chari, V V
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- Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986.
"Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-75, July.
- Atkeson, Andrew & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1996.
"Social Insurance and Transition,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 377-401, May.
- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995.
"Social insurance and transition,"
Staff Report
202, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995.
"Social insurance and transition,"
Working Papers
547, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993.
"Social Insurance and Transition,"
NBER Working Papers
4411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger A. McCain, 1987.
"Acceptable Contracts, Opportunism, and Rigid Hourly Wages,"
Eastern Economic Journal,
Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 205-213, Jul-Sep.
- Russell Cooper, 1983.
"On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
647R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Michele Boldrin & Michael Horvath, 1994.
"Labor Contracts and Business Cycles,"
Discussion Papers
1068, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1983.
"Unemployment and Insurance,"
NBER Working Papers
1095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Thomas, 2000.
"Fair Pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
234, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jonathan P. Thomas, 2000.
"Fair pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability,"
Labor and Demography
0004004, EconWPA.
- Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999.
"Fair Pay and a Wagebill Arguement for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability,"
Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics
9919, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
- Jonathan P. Thomas, 2001.
"Fair pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability,"
Labor and Demography
0012001, EconWPA.
- V.V. Chari, 1984.
"Layoffs and Unemployment Compensation as Social Instruments,"
Discussion Papers
617, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Russell Cooper, 1983.
"Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1985.
"Implicit Contracts: A Survey,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-75, September.
- Ed Nosal & Richard Rogerson & Randall Wright, 1991.
"A note on labor contracts with private information and household production,"
Staff Report
131, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Finkle, Aaron, 2005.
"Relying on information acquired by a principal,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1983.
"Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 23-54, Supplemen.
- Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Manuelli, Rodolfo E, 1989.
"Labor Contracts in a Model of Imperfect Competition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 358-63, May.
- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995.
"Optimal social insurance, incentives, and transition,"
Working Papers
546, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Anne C. Sibert, 1984.
"The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
248, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984.
"Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
348, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Anton Miglo, 2006.
"Optimal compensation contracts under asymmetric information concerning expected earnings,"
Working Papers
0613, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.