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Citations for "A Model Of Expertise"

by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan

For a complete description of this item, click here.
Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Robert Bartels & Denzil Fiebig & Arthur Soest, 2006. "Consumers and experts: an econometric analysis of the demand for water heaters," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 369-391, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Morris, 1998. "An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness," Discussion Papers 1209, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2005. "On the Value of Legal Representation," Discussion Papers 0506-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ilan Guttman & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2003. "Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management," Discussion Paper Series dp355, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  11. Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
  15. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  16. In-Uck Park, 2000. "Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Differentiated Experts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1680, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Frisell, Lars, 2000. "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 355, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  19. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2003. "Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Paper Archive 497, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Macroeconomics 0308002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "On the Composition of Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-006/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2003. "Ordinal Cheap Talk," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-05, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  24. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Clearly Biased Experts," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  25. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, . "International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory," Working Papers 229, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  26. Ulrich Doraszelski, 1999. "Deliberations with Double-Sided Information," Discussion Papers 1276R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  27. Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2005. "Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions," NBER Working Papers 11053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. CAILLAUD, Bernard & TIROLE, Jean, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," IDEI Working Papers 435, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  30. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  31. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
  32. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  33. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei, 2007. "Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure," MPRA Paper 6101, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  35. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  36. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  37. Viola Chen, 2008. "Essays in Applied Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002243, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  38. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  39. Nathaniel Wilcox, 2004. "Believing in Economic Theory: Sex, Lies, Evidence, Trust and Ideology," Working Papers 2004-06 Classification-, Department of Economics, University of Houston. [Downloadable!]
  40. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  41. GROMB, Denis & MARTIMORT, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," IDEI Working Papers 284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  42. Robert A. J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "Producing and Manipulating Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  43. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  44. Battaglini, Marco & Bénabou, Roland, 2002. "Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 3611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  45. Aaron S. Edlin, 1997. "Is the Corner Electronics Store Violationg the Antitrust Laws? (or Why the Good Guys Aren't)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.