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Citations for "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?"

by Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Rochet, Jean Charles & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Does the Federal Reserve possess an exploitable informational advantage?," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 2000. "EMU and Enlargement," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 481, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2001. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lamberte, Mario B., 2002. "Central Banking in the Philippines: Then, Now and the Future," Discussion Papers DP 2002-10, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2000. "Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher During the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier During the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Working Papers 7689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. William B. English & William R. Nelson & Brian P. Sack, 2003. "Interpreting the Significance of the Lagged Interest Rate in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  8. Narain, Aditya & Ghosh, Saibal, 2001. "Bank supervisory arrangements: International evidence and Indian perspective," MPRA Paper 17454, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 2000. "Identifying the macroeconomic effect of loan supply shocks," Working Papers 00-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
  11. Geraats, P.M., 2004. "Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0473, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  12. Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2008. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century," MPRA Paper 11862, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Vasso P. Ioannidou, 2002. "Monetary policy and bank supervision," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 189-205. [Downloadable!]
  14. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Using bank supervisory data to improve macroeconomic forecasts," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 21-32. [Downloadable!]
  15. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler , Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  18. Schüler , Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  19. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Ioannidou, V.P., 2002. "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?," Discussion Paper 54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Geraats, P.M, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0549, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2007. "Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective Action," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  23. Tore Ellingsen & Ulf Soderstrom, 2004. "Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy," Working Papers 256, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  24. John S. Jordan & Eric S. Rosengren, 2002. "Economic cycles and bank health," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  25. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  26. Anuchitworawong, Chaiyasit, 2004. "Financial fragility under implicit insurance scheme: Evidence from the collapse of Thai financial institutions," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-16, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  27. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2003. "Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Péter Gábriel & Klára Pintér, 2006. "The effect of the MNB’s communication on financial markets," MNB Working Papers 2006/9, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (The Central Bank of Hungary). [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.


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