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Citations for "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach"

by Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. R. Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 31-53, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Chew Soo Hong & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction," ISER Discussion Paper 0631, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Lunander, Anders & Lundberg, Sofia, 2009. "Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 776, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
  7. John Ledyard & David Porter & Randii Wessen, 2000. "A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-195, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul R. Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  9. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Olson, Mark & Porter, David., 1991. "An Experimental Examination of the Assignment Problem," Working Papers 775, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ishikida, Takashi & Ledyard, John O. & Olson, Mark & Porter, David., 2000. "Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's Reclaim Emmissions Market," Working Papers 1094, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  12. Noussair, Charles & Porter, David., 1990. "Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 747, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Peter R. Wurman & Michael P. Wellman, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions," Working Papers 99-09-064, Santa Fe Institute.
  14. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  15. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June. [Downloadable!]
  17. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Ascending Proxy Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000785, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Paul Healy & John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & Harley Thronson & Peter Ulrich & Giulio Varsi, 2007. "Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 143-167, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Said, Maher, 2009. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Aug 2009. [Downloadable!]
  20. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Economics Working Papers 01, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school). [Downloadable!]
  21. Ledyard, John O. & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Swanson, Joseph A. & Torma, David P., 2000. "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services," Working Papers 1093, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  22. Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1997. "Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses," Papers of Peter Cramton 97cra1b, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton. [Downloadable!]
  23. DeMartini, Christine & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David, 1998. "A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," Working Papers 1054, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  24. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey," Discussion Papers 1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2010-1-4.


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