Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window
  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Hori Kazumi, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-9, July.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  4. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  5. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  6. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  9. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  11. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083.
  12. Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 152-167.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  16. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  17. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  18. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.