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Citations for "Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment" by Daniel Nagin & James Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor
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Cited by (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.): Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2006.
"Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations ,"
Working Papers
06-11, Utrecht School of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2004.
"Time is money - Time pressure, incentives, and the quality of decision-making ,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2004-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Kocher, Martin G. & Sutter, Matthias, 2006.
"Time is money--Time pressure, incentives, and the quality of decision-making ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 375-392, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Huang Fali, 2004.
"Social Trust and Economic Governance ,"
Working Papers
14-2004, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00180112_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00175010_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Working Papers
0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
[Downloadable!] David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
Working Papers
05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
[Downloadable!] Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004.
"Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1222, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Dirk Sliwka, 2006.
"Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2293, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Christiane Schwieren & Doris Weichselbaumer, 2008.
"Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment ,"
NRN working papers
2008-05, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Schwieren, Christiane & Weichselbaumer, Doris, 2008.
"Does Competition Enhance Performance or Cheating? A Laboratory Experiment ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3275, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Christiane Schwieren & Doris Weichselbaumer, 2008.
"Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment ,"
Economics working papers
2008-01, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
[Downloadable!] Fali Huang & Peter Cappelli, 2006.
"Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence ,"
NBER Working Papers
12071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004.
"How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004.
"How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
987, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003.
"How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents ,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
[Downloadable!] Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004.
"How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents ,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
60, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008.
"How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) C. Bram Cadsby & Fei Song & Francis Tapon, 2008.
"Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation ,"
Working Papers
0810, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2003.
"Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word ,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
562, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2009.
"Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7114, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2008.
"Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3917, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2009.
"Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence From Personnel Data ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1047-1094, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Derek C. Jones & Takao Kato, 2007.
"The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality and Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2917, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008.
"Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Rickman, Neil & Witt, Robert, 2003.
"The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2003.
"The determinants of employee crime in the UK ,"
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
0703, Department of Economics, University of Surrey.
[Downloadable!] Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2007.
"The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK ,"
Economica ,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 161-175, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Glenn W. Harrison, 2005.
"Field Experiments in Economics: An Introduction ,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
0030, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!]
Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003.
"Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
887, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2008.
"Motivating Altruism: A Field Study ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3770, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
Natural Field Experiments
0046, The Field Experiments Website.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, .
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp144, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
732, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003.
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Lanse Minkler, 2003.
"Managing Moral Motivations ,"
Working papers
2003-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Tor Eriksson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008.
"Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00331753_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation ,"
Working Papers
07-12, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008.
"Performance-pay, sorting and social motivation ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 412-421, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004.
"To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma ,"
Development and Comp Systems
0409035, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Donald R. Davis & James Harrigan, 2007.
"Good jobs, bad jobs, and trade liberalization ,"
Discussion Papers
0607-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Benjamin A. Olken, 2005.
"Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia ,"
NBER Working Papers
11753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Benito Arruñada & Xosé H. Vázquez, 2009.
"Behavioral Assumptions and Management Ability: A Tentative Test ,"
Economics Working Papers
1157, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Garcia-Prado, Ariadna, 2005.
"Sweetening the carrot : motivating public physicians for better performance ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3772, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.
This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .