Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory

Citations

Cited by:

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   • Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2009. "Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0908, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
3. Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2018. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1995-2021, November.
   • Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 56, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
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17. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
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20. Ha Ta & Terry L. Esper & Kenneth Ford & Sebastian Garcia‐Dastuge, 2018. "Trustworthiness Change and Relationship Continuity after Contract Breach in Financial Supply Chains," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 54(4), pages 42-61, October.
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23. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
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