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Citations for "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence"

by Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J.

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Chaim Fershtman & Hans K. Hvide & Yoram Weiss, 2003. "A behavioral Explanation for the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 71-72, pages 16, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
  3. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143. [Downloadable!]
  4. James Ang & Beni Lauterbach & Ben Schreiber, 2000. "Pay at the Executive Suite: How do U.S. Banks Compensate their Top Management Teams?," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1064, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/31, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Michael Ian Cragg, 1995. "Performance Incentives in Government Subcontracting: Evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)," Labor and Demography 9507001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and State Ownership in China: Evidence from New Panel Data," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-690, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  8. Matthew Lilling, 2006. "The Link Between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: Does Simultaneity Matter?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 101-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Economics Working Papers 2009-01, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  10. Futoshi Yamauchi-K., 2000. "Labor Earnings Inequality and Learning About Individual Ability: Theory and Evidence from Japan and the United States," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0782, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. repec:fth:prinin:404 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Fahlenbrach, Rudiger & Minton, Bernadette A. & Pan, Carrie H., 2007. "The Market for Comeback CEOs," Working Paper Series 2007-4, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gehrig, Thomas P. & Lütje, Torben & Menkhoff, Lukas, 2008. "Bonus Payments and Fund Managers' Behavior: Trans-Atlantic Evidence," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-411, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2001. "Market-Indexed Executive Compensation: Strictly for the Young," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-19, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  15. Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler, 2008. "Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labour and Directed Production," Working Papers 0468, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  16. Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 844, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  17. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? - On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts," Discussion Papers 99, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Coupé, Tom & Smeets, Valérie & Warzynski, Frédéric, 2003. "Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists," Working Papers 03-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Fershtman, Chaim & Hvide, Hans K & Weiss, Yoram, 2003. "Cultural Diversity, Status Concerns and the Organization of Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 3982, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Darlene Chisholm, 2004. "Two-Part Share Contracts, Risk, and the Life Cycle of Stars: Some Empirical Results from Motion Picture Contracts," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 37-56, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Botond Koszegi & Wei Li, 2002. "Ambition and Talent," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0214, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  22. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2007. "Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 6422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias, 2005. "Fixed-term Contracts as Sorting Mechanisms: Evidence From Job Durations in West Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-85, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2001. "Insurance within the Firm," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 414, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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  26. Katharina Frosch & Thusnelda Tivig, 2007. "Age, Human Capital and the Geography of Innovation," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 71, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  27. Dasgupta, Amil & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Trading Volume with Career Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 4034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Olivier Cadot, 1997. "Career Concerns and the Acquisition of Firm-Specific Skills," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  29. Davila, Toni & Peñalva, Fernando, 2005. "Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation," IESE Research Papers D/601, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  30. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg, 1999. "Looking beyond the CEO: executive compensation at banks," Staff Reports 68, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  31. Engellandt, Axel & Riphahn, Regina, 2004. "Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort," CEPR Discussion Papers 4178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  32. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2007. "A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 13372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. William N. Goetzmann & Vicente Pons-Sanz & S. Abraham Ravid, 2004. "Soft Information, Hard Sell: The Role of Soft Information in the Pricing of Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 10468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Tomasz Sadzik & Yuliy Sannikov, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," NBER Working Papers 15324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  35. Joseph G. Haubrich & Ivilina Popova, 1994. "Executive compensation: a calibration approach," Working Paper 9416, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  36. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 2004. "High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect," IZA Discussion Papers 1143, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  37. Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler, 2005. "Division of Labour and Directed Production," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/126, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
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  38. Greg Hallman & Jay C. Hartzell, 1999. "Optimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-For-Performance and Termination Incentives," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-053, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  39. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Kremer & Atif Mian, 2003. "Incentives in Markets, Firms and Governments," NBER Working Papers 9802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  40. Peter Berck & Jonathan Lipow, 1999. "Managerial reputation and the "endgame"," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 884, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  41. Guillermo Caruana & Marco Celentani, 2001. "Career Concerns And Contingent Compensation," Economics Working Papers we014811, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  42. Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 406, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  43. Casamatta, Catherine & Gümbel, Alexander, 2007. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia," IDEI Working Papers 442, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  44. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John C. Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2006. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," NBER Working Papers 12435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  45. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
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  46. Sundaram, Rangarajan K. & Yermack, David, 2006. "Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation," SIFR Research Report Series 43, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  47. Hubert Ooghe & Veerle De Vuyst, 2001. "The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental European Corporate Governance Model: Empirical Evidence of Board Composition in Belgium," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2001-6, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. [Downloadable!]
  48. Xianming Zhou, 2002. "A Graphical Approach to the Standard Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Economic Education, Helen Dwight Reid Foundation, vol. 33(3), pages 265-276. [Downloadable!]
  49. Leonidas Enrique De La Rosa, 2008. "Overconfidence in a Career-Concerns Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  50. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1994. "High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-23, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  51. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  52. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market," IZA Discussion Papers 855, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  53. Bardsley, P., 2001. "Recursive Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 797, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  54. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 27-50. [Downloadable!]
  55. Michael Stolpe, 2003. "Learning and Signalling in the French and German Venture Capital Industries," Kiel Working Papers 1156, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  56. Illoong Kwon & Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, 2008. "On the Objective of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 08-08, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  57. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1998. "Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation," Working Papers 783, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  58. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  59. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300. [Downloadable!]
  60. Ching-mann Huang & Len-kuo Hu & Hsin-Hong Kang, 2005. "Compensation Design and Career Concerns of Fund Manager," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 379-397, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  61. S. Ravid & John Wald & Suman Basuroy, 2006. "Distributors and film critics: does it take two to Tango?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-218, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  62. Takao Kato & Woochan Kim & Ju Ho Lee, 2005. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1783, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  63. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2003. "Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation: Executives are Paid for (Good) Luck But Not Punished for Bad," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-01, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  64. Hristos Doucouliagos & Saeed Askary & Janto Haman, 2006. "Directors' Remuneration and Performance in Australian Banking," Economics Series 2006_11, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
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  65. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  66. Daniel Parent, 1997. "Methods of Pay and Earnings: A Longitudinal Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-14, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  67. Davila, Antonio & Peñalva, Fernando, 2004. "Corporate governance and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation," IESE Research Papers D/556, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  68. Robert A. Hart, 2005. "Piecework versus Timework in British Wartime Engineering," IZA Discussion Papers 1593, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  69. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  70. Fahlenbrach, Rudiger, 2008. "Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation," Working Paper Series 2008-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  71. Piet Eichholtz & Nils Kok & Roger Otten, 2008. "Executive Compensation in UK Property Companies," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 405-426, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  72. Lily Qiu, 2005. "Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers 2005-08, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  73. Hernán Ortiz-Molina & María Penas, 2008. "Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 361-383, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  74. Darius Palia & S. Ravid & Chia-Jane Wang, 2008. "Founders versus non-founders in large companies: financial incentives and the call for regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-86, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  75. Antoine Renucci & Frédéric Loss, 2004. "When Promotions Induce Good Managers to Be Lazy," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 263, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  76. Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "Scapegoats and Transparency in Organizations," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 407, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  77. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2002. "Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3481, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  78. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," NBER Working Papers 6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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