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Citations for "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations"

by Tirole, Jean

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  1. Jinyoung Hwang & Neville Nien-Heui Jiang & Ping Wang, 2002. "Financial Collusion and Over-Lending," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0229, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Oct 2003.
  2. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19356, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  4. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
  5. Edward S. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2000. "Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information," Working Paper 00-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  6. Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 25, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Strausz, R., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 54, Econometric Society.
  9. Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2000. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Care about Fairness," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 489, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004.
  10. R. Strausz, 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION)," Game Theory and Information 9510002, EconWPA, revised 03 Apr 1996.
  11. Strausz, R., 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Kouroche Vafaï, 1999. "A Theory of Abuse of Authority in Hierarchies," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-07, CIRANO.
  13. Michela Cella, 2011. "Monitoring subcontracting in a suppliers' hierarchy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 523-548, July.
  14. Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank.
  15. Michele Polo & Piero Tedeschi, . "Equilibrium and Renegotiation in Delegation Games," Working Papers 116, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  16. Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," Working Papers w0063, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Jun 2006.
  17. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The dark side of competitive pressure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  18. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., . "Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1218, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  19. BORDIGNON, Massimo & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Rules transparency and political accountability," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  21. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  22. Dessi, Roberta, 2004. "Start-up Finance, Monitoring and Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 264, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  23. Ingela Alger, 2006. "Optimal Debt Contracts when Credit Managers are (Perhaps) Corruptible," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 648, Boston College Department of Economics.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Bennedsen, Morten, 1999. "Political Ownership," Working Papers 11-1999, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  26. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2006. "Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers?," NBER Working Papers 12274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 407, Hunter College: Department of Economics.
  28. Marcel Boyer & Tracy Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996. "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-27, CIRANO.
  29. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.