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Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dufwenberg, Martin, 1997. "Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 45-50, November.
  2. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Matthijs van Veelen, 2010. "But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-033/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J.W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1637, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2024. "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 51-76.
  6. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Three steps ahead," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  7. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
  9. Andreas Blume, 1995. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9504002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 May 1996.
  10. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
  11. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2010. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-715, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  12. Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1991. "Viscous population equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-109, February.
  13. Kenichi Amaya, 2004. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Pre-Play Communication and Efficiency in Games," Discussion Paper Series 165, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  14. Possajennikov, A., 2000. "Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models," Other publications TiSEM be1a3e81-e186-46b5-9101-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
  16. van Veelen, Matthijs, 2012. "Robustness against indirect invasions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 382-393.
  17. Marimon, R. & McGraltan, E., 1993. "On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games," Papers 190, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  18. Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Graz Economics Papers 2019-10, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  19. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
  20. De Jaegher, Kris, 2008. "Efficient communication in the electronic mail game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 468-497, July.
  21. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "Honesty in a Signaling Model of Tax Evasion," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-022/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  22. Peter Wikman, 2022. "Nash blocks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 29-51, March.
  23. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
  24. Karl H. Schlag, "undated". "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  25. Blume, A., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games : An Experiment," Other publications TiSEM de6f95e4-de05-4ec5-95c9-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  26. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
  27. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)," MPRA Paper 102926, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jul 2021.
  28. Gans, Joshua S., 1995. "Evolutionary selection of beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 13-17, July.
  29. Mansoor Saburov, 2022. "On Discrete-Time Replicator Equations with Nonlinear Payoff Functions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 643-661, June.
  30. Alex Possajennikov, 2004. "Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 227-263, November.
  31. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  32. Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December.
  33. Possajennikov, Alex, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a merger game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 255-261, August.
  34. Kris De Jaegher, 2008. "The evolution of Horn's rule," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 275-284.
  35. Gerard van der Laan & A.F. Tieman, 1996. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 96-172/8, Tinbergen Institute.
  36. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  37. Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.
  39. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2015. "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 423-460, November.
  40. Lars P. Metzger, 2018. "Evolution and correlated equilibrium," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 333-346, April.
  41. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  42. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
  43. Liu, Yang & Cui, Mengying & Gao, Xubin, 2023. "Building up scrap steel bases for perfecting scrap steel industry chain in China: An evolutionary game perspective," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 278(C).
  44. Kenichi Amaya, 2006. "Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 310-325, April.
  45. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2014. "Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-113.
  46. Chongmin Kim & Kam-Chau Wong, 2017. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 55-94.
  47. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 375-402, February.
  48. Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2002. "On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 66-90, September.
  49. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Civil institutions and evolution: Concepts, critique and models," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 19-33, February.
  50. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion," Working Papers 2005:37, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  51. W. C. Abram & K. Noray, 2018. "Political Corruption and Public Activism: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, March.
  52. Desierto, D., 2005. "The Co-evolution of Institutions and Technology," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0558, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  53. Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.
  54. Desiree A. Desierto, 2008. "The Dynamics of Economic Integration," DEGIT Conference Papers c013_029, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
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