Information And Timing In Repeated Partnerships

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Citations for "Information And Timing In Repeated Partnerships"

by Abreu, D. & Milgrom, P. & Pearce, D.

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):

David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
Jussi Keppo & Giuseppe Moscarini & Lones Smith, 2005. "The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1498, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jussi Keppo & Giuseppe Moscarini & Lones Smith, 2005. "The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light," 2005 Meeting Papers 798, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- Keppo, Jussi & Moscarini, Giuseppe & Smith, Lones, 2008. "The demand for information: More heat than light," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 21-50, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2001. "Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 747-766, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2000. "Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare," Discussion Papers 1285, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2000. "Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks and Welfare," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2133, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2000. "Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks And Welfare," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 130, Society for Computational Economics.
Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 4071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts," Discussion Papers 0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004. "Partnership in a Dynamic Production System," Research Papers 1892, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2007. "Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 472, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2005. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," Research Papers 1887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December. [Downloadable!]
Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2008. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002038, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information 0511007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," 2005 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- William Fuchs, 2007. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1432-1448, September. [Downloadable!]
Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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