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Citations for "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake"

by Robson, A.J.

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2002. "Norm compliance and strong reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-03, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Chun-Lei Yang & Ching-Syang Jack Yue & I-Tang Yu, 2007. "The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 3-20, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joerg Oechssler, 1993. "Competition among Conventions," Game Theory and Information 9312001, EconWPA, revised 04 Dec 1993. [Downloadable!]
  4. Manzini, P. & Sadrieh, A. & Vriend, N.J., 2002. "On smiles, winks, and handshake as coordination devices," Discussion Paper 40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. David K Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001015, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  6. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kenichi Amaya, 2004. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Pre-Play Communication and Efficiency in Games," Discussion Paper Series 165, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Wendelin Schnedler, 2003. "Traits, Imitation and Evolutionary Dynamics," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/081, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
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  9. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  10. Poulsen, Anders, 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers 01-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Rajiv Sethi & E.Somanathan, 2002. "Understanding reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-05, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Dan Ashlock, 1995. "Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal," Game Theory and Information 9501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kenichi Amaya, 2006. "Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 310-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 338., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
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    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  17. David Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  18. Brian Skyrms, 2003. "Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000799, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  19. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Maria Vittoria Levati, . "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  21. Ramon Marimon & Ellen McGrattan, 1993. "On Adaptive Learning in Strategic Games," Economics Working Papers 24, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Chun Lei Yang & Ching Syang Jack Yue, 2004. "The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000097, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  23. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  24. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  25. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  26. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2006. "Altruism and Climate," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 643, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.

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