Efficiency in partnerships

Citations

Cited by:

1. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019. "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Revised version of F415 )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-464, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
2. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
   • Hege, U. & Feess, E., 1998. "Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard," Other publications TiSEM e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-00759758, HAL.
3. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
   • David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
4. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
5. Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018. "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-32.
   • Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Post-Print hal-02621924, HAL.
   • Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Working Papers halshs-01936006, HAL.
   • Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-01936006, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
   • Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018. "Overburdened judges," Working Papers hal-02791013, HAL.
6. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
   • Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and nearly efficient partnerships," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
7. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
8. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
9. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Other publications TiSEM 922950b4-a0c9-4c2f-9cc8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Sonia Falconieri & Frederic Palomino & Jozsef Sakovics, 2002. "Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 85, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F.A. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Discussion Paper 2002-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
10. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
    • Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series CARF-F-462, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," KIER Working Papers 1018, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
12. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1119, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," CARF F-Series CARF-F-459, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," KIER Working Papers 1017, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
13. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG (Revised version of F-386)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-415, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CARF F-Series CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
15. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
    • d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998. "Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
16. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
    • Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Joint Production in Teams," CEPR Discussion Papers 4702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
17. Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023. "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
19. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
20. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
21. Matsushima, Hitoshi & Noda, Shunya, 2023. "Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    • Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2019. "Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1124, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
22. Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Discussion Paper 1997-109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Hege, U. & Viala, P., 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Other publications TiSEM 6f3c7c98-ae1f-4113-a230-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Ulrich Hege & Pascale Viala, 2012. "Contentious Contracts," Working Papers hal-00759794, HAL.
    • HEGE, Ulrich & VIALA, Pascale, 1997. "Contentious Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9711, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Hege, Ulrich & Viala, Pascale, 1998. "Contentious Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
23. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
24. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1015, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2016. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure Groves," CARF F-Series CARF-F-386, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
25. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
26. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
27. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
28. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-179, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
29. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
30. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-714, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CARF F-Series CARF-F-205, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
31. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
32. Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2022. "Profit Sharing and Incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2017. "Profit Sharing and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12355, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
33. De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013. "Partnership, reciprocity and team design," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 39-58.
    • Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino, 2010. "Partnership, Reciprocity and Team Design," CSEF Working Papers 257, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 24 Mar 2011.
34. Madanmohan Ghosh & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1999. "The Value of MFN Treatment to Developing Countries," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
35. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, July.
    • Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753, HAL.
36. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
    • Rui Zhao, 2001. "Repeated Two-Sided Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 01-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
37. Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, 2017. "Contract Structure for Joint Production: Risk and Ambiguity Under Compensatory Damages," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1232-1253, April.
38. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2002. "Sharing Rules in Teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 407-420, December.
39. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
40. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2017. "Mechanism Design in Hidden Action and Hidden Information: Richness and Pure-VCG," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1057, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
41. Jungho Lee, 2020. "Estimating the benefits and costs of forming business partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 531-562, June.
42. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
43. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
44. Michael T. Rauh, 2014. "Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 533-552, September.
    • Michael T. Rauh, 2013. "Incentives, Wages, Employment, and the Division of Labor in Teams," Working Papers 2013-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
45. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
46. Mauricio S. Bugarin, 2015. "Efficiency in a Monotonic Partnership with Investment: An Endogenous Implementation of Holmstrom’s Principal," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 4(3), pages 127-135, September.
47. Corts, Kenneth S., 2006. "The interaction of task and asset allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 887-906, September.
48. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
49. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
50. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
51. Verbeck, Matthias, 2015. "Contracting with Researchers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112963, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
52. Kenneth S. Corts, 2007. "Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask problems through job design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 467-479, June.
53. O'Brien, Daniel P., 2017. "All-units discounts and double moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 1-28.
54. Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016. "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201620, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).