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Citations for "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information"

by Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Deneckere, Raymond J.

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1. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 137, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
2. Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice," Papers of Peter Cramton 91beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
   
   • Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
4. Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 151, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
   
   • Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1760, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000117, David K. Levine.
5. Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 69, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   
   • Helmut Bester, 2009. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 269-296, November.
   • Helmut Bester, . "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Papers 027, Departmental Working Papers.
   • Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 5391, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Bester, Helmut, 2005. "Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights," Discussion Papers 2005/21, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
6. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
7. Boes, Dieter, . "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Discussion Paper Serie A 593, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Apr 1999.
8. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
9. Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
   
   • Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January.
10. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
11. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, 07.
    
    • Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 94, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
12. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
    
    • Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    • Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
13. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 119-137, September.
    
    • KOHLER, Stefan, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Open Access publications from European University Institute urn:hdl:1814/23782, European University Institute.
14. Bos, Dieter, 1999. "Incomplete contracting and price regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 353-371, September.
15. Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond, 2004. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 42, Econometric Society.
    
    • Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 2011. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 887-924, 09.
16. Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
17. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1997. "Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 425-437, April.

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