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Citations for "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies"

by Porter, Robert H.

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1984. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 726, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1998. "Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics," Papers of Peter Cramton 93beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Michael Noel, 2004. "Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-based Pricing and Sticky Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2004-04, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pedro Dal Bó, 2001. "Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Tomaso Duso, 2005. "Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 251-276, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. José J. Sempere Monerris & Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz, 1998. "- Duopoly Price Communication," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  12. Maura P. Doyle & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Information sharing and competition in the motor vehicle industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-4, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  13. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Michael Noel, 2004. "Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence from the Toronto Retail Gasoline Market," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2004-03, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  15. Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel, 2006. "Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline," Working Papers 0611, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," NBER Working Papers 1412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Pedro Dal Bó, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Schmalensee, Richard., 1985. "Competitive advantage and collusion," Working papers 1724-85., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  19. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  20. Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1988. "Institutional aspects of credit cooperatives," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  21. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  22. Andrea Lofaro, 1999. "When imperfect collusion is profitable," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 235-259, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Carlos E. Zarazaga, 1995. "Hyperinflations and moral hazard in the appropriation of seigniorage: an empirical implementation with a calibration approach," Working Papers 95-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  24. Pedro Dal Bo, 2002. "Three Essays on Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000038, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  25. Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Chaim Fershtman & Eitan Muller, 1983. "Capital Accumulation and the Sustainability of Collusive Markets," Discussion Papers 566, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  27. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 1999. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," NBER Working Papers 6936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1991. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Papers of Peter Cramton 90ier, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2006. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 06-32, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  30. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  31. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  32. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  34. Gupta, B., 1995. "Collusion in the Indian Tea Industry in the Great Depression : An Analysis of Panel Data," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  35. Harrison Cheng, 2005. "Inefficiency in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games," IEPR Working Papers 05.12, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

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