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Citations for "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox"

by Rosenthal, Robert W.

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Itzhak Gilboa, 1989. "A Note on the Consistency of Game Theory," Discussion Papers 847, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Raymond Deneckere & Meng-Yu Liang, 2001. "Bargaining with Interdependent Values," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20017, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2006. "Valuation Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000111, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Gagen, Michael & Nemoto, Kae, 2006. "Variational optimization of probability measure spaces resolves the chain store paradox," MPRA Paper 4778, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Philippe Jeniel, 2001. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 0003, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Andrea Gallice, 2008. "Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game," ICER Working Papers 02-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Droste, E. & Kosfeld, M. & Voorneveld, M., 1998. "Regret equilibria in games," Discussion Paper 19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series dp298, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  10. Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt, 2005. "Trust among Strangers," Game Theory and Information 0504006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Asheim, Geir B, 2000. "Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games," Research Papers in Economics 2000:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Thierry Vignolo, 2003. "Reputation by imitation: an evolutionary chain-store game with strategic matching," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(4), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
  13. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002. "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series 115, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Perea, Andrés, 2006. "Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning," Research Memoranda 035, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  15. Francesco Squintani, 2004. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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  16. G. Caginalp, H. Laurent, 1998. "The predictive power of price patterns," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(3-4), pages 181-205, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  18. W. Güth & H. Kliemt, . "From full to bounded rationality - The limits of unlimited rationality," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2001-12, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  19. Lluis Bru & Susana Cabrera & C. Capra & Rosario Gomez, 2003. "A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 91-114, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Markus K Brunnermeier & John Morgan, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  22. Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Public statistics and private experience : Varying feedback information in a take or pass game," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000733, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  23. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  24. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas., 1991. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Working Papers 732, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  25. R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, . "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," ELSE working papers 027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
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  26. R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Giovanni B. Ponti, . "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 16-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, . "Field Centipedes," Economic theory and game theory 020, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
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  30. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 333, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  31. Alexander S. Kritikos & Jonathan H.W. Tan, 2006. "Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test," Working Papers 0005, Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmarktaktivierung (GfA). [Downloadable!]
  32. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  33. Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Noncooperative Game Theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets," Research Reports 25183, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center. [Downloadable!]
  34. Geoffrey Dunbar & Juan Tu & Ruqu Wang & Xiaoting Wang, 2006. "Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs," Working Papers 1033, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  35. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  36. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel, Marek P., 1982. "Threat Power in Sequential Games," Working Papers 82-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  37. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  38. El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1992. "A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games," Working Papers 757, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  39. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  40. Velu, C. & Iyer, S., 2008. "The Rationality of Irrationality for Managers: Returns- Based Beliefs and the Traveller’s Dilemma," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0826, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  41. Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers 0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  42. Velu, C. & Iyer, S., 2008. "Returns-Based Beliefs and The Prisoner’s Dilemma," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0854, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  43. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1979. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing Doesn't Limit Entry," Discussion Papers 399R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  44. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Department of Economics Working Papers 1997-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

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