This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Citations for "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities"

by Haile, Philip A.

For a complete description of this item, click here.
Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Menezes, F. & Ryan, M.J., 2002. "Auctions with options to re-auction," Discussion Paper 55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Thomas Tröger & Rodney Garratt & Charles Zheng, 2008. "Collusion via Resale," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse20_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2004. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Microeconomics 0405005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Marco Pagnozzi, 2004. "Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale," CSEF Working Papers 116, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  6. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Resale and Bundling in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 186, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  8. repec:att:wimass:19199933 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Sui, Yong, 2006. "All-pay auctions with resale," MPRA Paper 11463, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  10. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2006. "Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000113, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999. [Downloadable!]
  12. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "A New Empirical Study of the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Is there more underpricing?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000206, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers 3, Kyiv School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale," Microeconomics 0308001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ausubel, Lawerence M. & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The optimality of being efficient : designing auctions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1985, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Competing Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 17, Kyiv School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp4-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  19. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Should Speculators Be Welcomed in Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers 176, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  20. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Working Paper Series in Economics 27, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. Thomas Tröger, 2004. "The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  24. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1404, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  25. James Andreoni & John H Miller, 2001. "Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000096, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  26. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  27. Nicolas Melissas, 2008. "Bidding and Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts," Working Papers 0805, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  28. Charles Zheng, 2000. "An Optimal Auction When Resale Cannot Be Prohibited," Discussion Papers 1303, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  29. Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 1-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.