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Citations for "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring"

by Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric

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  1. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
  2. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  3. William Fuchs, 2007. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1432-1448, September.
  4. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  5. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
  6. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  7. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
  8. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August.
  9. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  10. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  11. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. V. Bhaskar & G. J. Mailath & S. Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 576, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  13. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  14. Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March.
  15. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
  16. V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  17. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  18. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.