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Citations for "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring"

by Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric

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  1. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
  3. Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March.
  4. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1451, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  6. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August.
  8. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
  9. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
  10. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  11. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
  12. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0511007, EconWPA.
  13. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  14. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  15. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  16. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
  17. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  18. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.