This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Citations for "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments"

by Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis

For a complete description of this item, click here.
Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Ernesto Reuben & Arno Riedl, 2007. "Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Martin Sefton & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2007. "The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia," Discussion Papers 2007-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2004. "Collective action in the commons: A theoretical framework for empirical research," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-21, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
  6. Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Peter Martinsson & Gianandrea Staffiero, 2005. "Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good, Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  7. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno, 2009. "Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations," IZA Discussion Papers 4303, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Csóka Péter & Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy László Á. & Pintér Miklós, 2009. "Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility," Research Memoranda 031, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Marco Casari, 2005. "On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 107-115, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/07, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2005. "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0503, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Umut Ones & Louis Putterman, 2004. "The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation," Working Papers 2004-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment," Working Papers 0206, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Heijden, Eline van der, 2005. "Hierarchy and opportunism in teams," Discussion Paper 109, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Institution design in social dilemmas: How to design if you must?," MPRA Paper 16922, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  17. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Punishment, Inequality and Emotions," Working Papers 0604, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Nathalie Colombier & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza & Claude Montmarquette, 2009. "Global Security Policies Against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental Approach," CIRANO Working Papers 2009s-44, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  19. Marco Casari & Luigi Luini, 2005. "Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 002, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Asher, Sam & Casaburi, Lorenzo & Nikolov, Plamen & Ye, Maoliang, 2009. "One Step at a Time: Do Threshold Patterns Matter in Public Good Provision?," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-5, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 475-502, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Laurent Denant-Boemont & David Masclet & Charles Noussair, 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 145-167, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2008. "Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1036, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  25. Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2008. "The Effect of Historical Entitlements in Cooperative Bargaining Over Evironment Policy: An Experimental Test," Working Papers in Economics 08/09, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  26. Brosig, Jeannette, 2006. "Communication channels and induced behavior," MPRA Paper 14035, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  27. Nikos Nikiforakis & Dirk Engelmann, 2008. "Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1058, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  28. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  29. Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Shut Up and Fish: The Role of Communication when Output-Sharing is used to Manage a Common Pool Resource," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-15, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
  30. Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-06, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.