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Bidding in hierarchies

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Cited by:

  1. Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 215-243, January.
  2. Bhattacharya, Puja & Rampal, Jeevant, 2019. "Contests within and between groups," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-206, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  3. Hideo Konishi & Chen‐Yu Pan, 2020. "Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 95-105, March.
  4. Aner Sela, 2023. "Is there free riding in group contests?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 191-201, October.
  5. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
  6. Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2021. "Your failure is my opportunity—Effects of elimination in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  7. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2018. "To Deter Or To Moderate? Alliance Formation In Contests With Incomplete Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1447-1463, July.
  8. Ke, Changxia & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 61-76.
  9. Münster, Johannes, 2004. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 4, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  10. Sela, Aner, 2011. "Best-of-three all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 67-70, July.
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel & Ueda, Kaoru, 2009. "Collective contests for commons and club goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 48-55, February.
  12. Konrad, Kia A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1192, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  13. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," IZA Discussion Papers 7736, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  14. Christian Groh & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Uwe Sunde, 2012. "Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 59-80, January.
  15. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
  16. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities," IZA Discussion Papers 2391, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  17. Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 62(4), pages 359-377, October.
  18. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2010. "Contests With Stochastic Abilities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 89-103, January.
  19. Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias, 2012. "Internal rent seeking, works councils, and optimal establishment size," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 711-726.
  20. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
  21. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2020. "Tournament-stable equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 41-51.
  22. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
  23. Heinrich Ursprung, 2012. "The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests: Incentives crowd out cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 149-161, October.
  24. Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2021. "Endogenous alliances in survival contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 337-358.
  25. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "On the "Adverse Selection" of Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 168, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  26. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Group contest success functions [Group Contest Success Functions]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-20, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  27. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2009. "A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 205-232, September.
  28. Nitzan, Shmuel & Ueda, Kaoru, 2011. "Prize sharing in collective contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 678-687, June.
  29. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  30. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2015. "Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 133-149, July.
  31. Deck, Cary & Foster, Joshua & Song, Hongwei, 2015. "Defense against an opportunistic challenger: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(2), pages 501-513.
  32. Aner Sela, 2021. "Resource Allocations In Multi-Stage Contests," Working Papers 2105, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  33. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
  34. James W. Boudreau & Lucas Rentschler & Shane Sanders, 2019. "Stag hunt contests and alliance formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 267-285, June.
  35. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
  36. Aner Sela & Eyal Erez, 2013. "Dynamic contests with resource constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 863-882, October.
  37. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2008. "Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(533), pages 2047-2059, November.
  38. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with investment [Wettkämpfe mit Investitionen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-09, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  39. Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Dynamic contests," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-10, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  40. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  41. Aner Sela & Eyal Erez, 2010. "Round-Robin Tournaments With Effort Constraints," Working Papers 1009, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  42. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  43. Rittwik Chatterjee, 2013. "A Brief Survey of the Theory of Auction," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 2(2), pages 169-191, December.
  44. Aner Sela, 2023. "Resource allocations in the best-of-k ( $$k=2,3$$ k = 2 , 3 ) contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 235-260, August.
  45. Send, Jonas, 2020. "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 858-874.
  46. Sela, Aner & Megidish, Reut, 2014. "Optimal Allocations in Round-Robin Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 9873, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  48. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2016. "Double round-robin tournaments," Discussion Papers 2016-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  49. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
  50. Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  51. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
  52. Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
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