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Citations for "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model"

by Kim, Son Ku

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  1. Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE.
  2. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE.
  3. Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 146-83, May.
  4. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
  5. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Larmande, Francois, 2013. "Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 314-317.
  8. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
  9. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2001. "Estimation Of An Optimal Tomato Contract," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20560, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  10. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Contracting Case," Economics Series 2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  11. Newman, Andrew F., 2007. "Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 11-26, November.
  12. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  13. Hooper, Louise, 2008. "Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 157-163, January.
  14. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3568z5kq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  15. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-18, CIRANO.
  16. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  17. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  18. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2007. "Moral hazard and persistence," Working Paper 07-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  19. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  20. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  21. Roland Strausz, . "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Papers 021, Departmental Working Papers.
  22. Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 359-78, April.
  23. Brice Corgnet & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2012. "Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design," Working Papers 12-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  24. Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, . "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  25. Joachim Gassen, 2008. "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-028, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  26. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: the exporting firm," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/09, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  27. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  28. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
  29. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
  30. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard & Wong, Kit Pong, 2010. "International trade and the role of market transparency," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 08/10, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  31. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  32. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2007. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 287-307, August.
  33. Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
  34. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 2006_22, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  35. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: The exporting firm," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 974-977, September.
  36. Nafziger, Julia, 2009. "Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 751-766, December.
  37. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Paper 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  38. Li, Fei & Ueda, Masako, 2009. "Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 2-12, March.