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Citations for "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information" by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric
For a complete description of this item, click here .
Cited by (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.): Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003.
"Repeated Games with Observation Costs ,"
Discussion Papers
0203-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Kyle Bagwell, 2004.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity ,"
Theory workshop papers
658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2002.
"Collusion and price rigidity ,"
Discussion Papers
0102-38, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity ,"
Working papers
98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004.
"Collusion and Price Rigidity ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349, 04.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989.
"Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
920, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Eduardo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2006.
"Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring ,"
Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting]
113, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
[Downloadable!]
Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006.
"Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms ,"
NBER Working Papers
12224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000.
"Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1036, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002.
"Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: David K Levine, 2000.
"The Castle on the Hill ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2068, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Michihiro Kandori, 2006.
"Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999.
"Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1237, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, 2000.
"Game Theory and Industrial Organization ,"
Discussion Papers
1307, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, 2002.
"Game theory and industrial organization ,"
Discussion Papers
0102-36, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Bagwell, K. & Wolinsky, A., 2000.
"Game Theory and Industrial Organization ,"
Discussion Papers
2000_01, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002.
"Game theory and industrial organization ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Francois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Kene Boun My, 2005.
"The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory: A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism ,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2005-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!]
Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999.
"Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2073, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, .
"The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case ,"
CARESS Working Papres
99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2008.
"Strikes as the 'Tip of the Iceberg' in a Theory of Firm-Union Cooperation ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6644, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
281, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998.
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007.
"Social Memory and Evidence from the Past ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt ,"
Discussion Papers
1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt ,"
NBER Working Papers
12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt ,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
[Downloadable!] Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt ,"
Working Papers
07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
[Downloadable!] Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-36, March.
[Downloadable!] Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009.
"Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Liliane Karlinger, 2008.
"How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel ,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0803, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008.
"The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring ,"
IDEI Working Papers
527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Pedro Dal Bo, 2001.
"Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
802, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: David K. Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Introduction ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 213-215, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2127, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Gary Gorton & Ping He, 2006.
"Agency-Based Asset Pricing ,"
NBER Working Papers
12084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
826, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004.
"Bidder Collusion ,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
108, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2005.
"Folk Theorem with Communication ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
366, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Andrew K. Rose, 2002.
"One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade ,"
NBER Working Papers
8853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Andrew K. Rose, 2002.
"One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade ,"
EUI-RSCAS Working Papers
18, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
[Downloadable!] Rose, Andrew K, 2002.
"One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3157, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Andrew K. Rose, 2001.
"One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade ,"
Staff Reports
142, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[Downloadable!] Andrew K. Rose, 2002.
"One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade ,"
Working Papers
042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
[Downloadable!] Rose, Andrew K., 2005.
"One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 189-206, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000.
"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002.
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
318, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Roland Strausz, .
"Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture ,"
Papers
018, Departmental Working Papers.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Roland Strausz, 2004.
"Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture ,"
Discussion Papers
25, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!] Strausz, Roland, 2005.
"Honest certification and the threat of capture ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ichiro Obara, .
"Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
399, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Game Theory and Information
0410001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), .
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Working Papers
gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2003.
"The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth ,"
IDEI Working Papers
170, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, .
"Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment ,"
Papers
023, Departmental Working Papers.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004.
"Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment ,"
Discussion Papers
24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!] Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005.
"Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997.
"Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
633, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Wojciech Olszewski, 2007.
"A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games ,"
Economics Bulletin ,
Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16.
[Downloadable!]
repec:att:wimass:19199819 is not listed on IDEAS
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003.
"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004.
"Reputation and Turnover ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]
Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2001.
"Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
95ec48d1c0f2065e1d4aaeb99, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!]
George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
2005 Meeting Papers
25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
[Downloadable!] George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!] George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!] George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
[Downloadable!] George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006.
"Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring ,"
Theoretical Economics ,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
[Downloadable!] Karavaev, Andrei, 2008.
"Information Trading in Social Networks ,"
MPRA Paper
9110, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Jeffrey Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2006.
"Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2106, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2005.
"Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production ,"
Research Papers
1887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Nicolas Gruyer, 2005.
"Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude ,"
Economics Working Papers
02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
[Downloadable!]
Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000.
"Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1482, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
275, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
David A. Miller, 2005.
"The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information ,"
Game Theory and Information
0510002, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Ariane Lambert Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2006.
"Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel- Favoritism in Procurement Auctions ,"
Working Papers
w0074, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Pedro Dal Bo, 2002.
"Three Essays on Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000038, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005.
"When is Reputation Bad ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004.
"When is Reputation Bad? ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002.
"When is Reputation Bad? ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002.
"When is Reputation Bad? ,"
Discussion Papers
1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008.
"When is reputation bad? ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) repec:att:wimass:1920217 is not listed on IDEAS
d'Aspremont, Claude & Crémer, Jacques & Gérard-Varet, Louis-André, 2003.
"Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms ,"
IDEI Working Papers
196, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CRƒMER, Jacques & GƒRARD-VARET, Louis-AndrŽ, 2002.
"Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2002048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!] d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 2004.
"Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 385-396, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Luis Rayo, 2002.
"Relational Team Incentives and Ownership ,"
Theory workshop papers
357966000000000087, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Massimiliano Amarante, 2002.
"Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring ,"
Discussion Papers
0102-48, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000.
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1330, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, .
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002.
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004.
"Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000334, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004.
"Collusion with persistent cost shocks ,"
Discussion Papers
0405-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007.
"Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008.
"Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Kyle Bagwell, 2005.
"Trust, reciprocity and favors in cooperative relationships ,"
Discussion Papers
0405-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003.
"Private Monitoring in Auctions ,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gerlach, Heiko, 2007.
"Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion ,"
IESE Research Papers
D/674, IESE Business School.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
607, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989.
"An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information ,"
Working papers
525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991.
"An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2002.
"Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring ,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2001.
"Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions ,"
Research Papers
1698r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Harrison Cheng, 2005.
"Inefficiency in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games ,"
IEPR Working Papers
05.12, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
[Downloadable!]
Luís Cabral, 2005.
"Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next? ,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade ,
Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007.
"Political Economy of Mechanisms ,"
Working Papers
CAS_RN_2007_2, Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gary Gorton & Ping He, 2005.
"Bank Credit Cycles ,"
NBER Working Papers
11363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRƒMER, Jacques & GƒRARD-VARET, Louis-AndrŽ, 2003.
"Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Markus Kinateder, 2006.
"Repeated Games Played in a Network ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001.
"Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 379-398, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001.
"Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case ,"
NBER Working Papers
8145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Genesove, David & Mullin, Wallace P, 2001.
"Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Michihiro Kandori, 2007.
"Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Eric Maskin, 2001.
"Roy Radner and Incentive Theory ,"
Economics Working Papers
0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Osório-Costa, António M., 2009.
"Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time ,"
MPRA Paper
13105, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Feb 2009.
[Downloadable!]
Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005.
"On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements ,"
Economics Working Papers
914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2007.
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2007089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!] Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008.
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003.
"Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit ,"
Discussion Papers
1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2005.
"Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
365, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Jonathan Levin, 2003.
"Relational Incentive Contracts ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Massimiliano Amarante, 2003.
"Equivalence of public mixed-strategies and private behavior-strategies in games with public monitoring ,"
Discussion Papers
0203-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005.
"Robustly collusion-proof implementation ,"
Discussion Papers
0506-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Larry Samuelson, 2003.
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations ,"
Theory workshop papers
505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001.
"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori, 2001.
"Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-139, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006.
"Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004.
"The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ,"
Discussion Papers
0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996.
"Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
59, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004.
"Partnership in a Dynamic Production System ,"
Research Papers
1892, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Nicolas Gruyer, 2008.
"Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...") ,"
Economics Working Papers
06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
[Downloadable!]
Stanislav Anatolyev & Grigory Kosenok, 2006.
"Tests in contingency tables as regression tests ,"
Working Papers
w0075, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
[Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004.
"The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002.
"The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007.
"The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Ichiro Obara, 2008.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1).
[Downloadable!]
Massimiliano Amarante, 2002.
"Equivalence of public mixed-strategies and private behavior strategies in games with public monitoring ,"
Discussion Papers
0102-49, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004.
"Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation? ,"
MPRA Paper
5416, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Timothy L. Sorenson, 2007.
"Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly ,"
Managerial and Decision Economics ,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 115-128.
[Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007.
"Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998.
"Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring ,"
Game Theory and Information
9809004, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gea M. Lee, 2004.
"Collusion with Internal Contracting ,"
Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
693, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori, 1999.
"Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-45, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004.
"Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers ,"
Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
736, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Per Overgaard, 1992.
"Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players ,"
Journal of Economics ,
Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000.
"Mediation in Situations of Conflict ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0361, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008.
"Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships ,"
KIER Working Papers
650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002.
"Learning from failure ,"
Staff Report
299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 1999.
"A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars ,"
NBER Working Papers
6936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Fershtman, C. & Pakes, A., 1998.
"A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars ,"
Papers
26-98, Tel Aviv.
Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000.
"A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.
Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006.
"Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Osório-Costa, António M., 2009.
"Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty ,"
MPRA Paper
13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2000.
"Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1449, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Harrison Cheng, 2000.
"Folk Theorem with One-sided Information ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006.
"When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ,"
Discussion Papers
1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000.
"Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Mouraviev, Igor, 2006.
"Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication ,"
Working Paper Series
672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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