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Citations for "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements"

by Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie

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  1. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  2. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  3. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  4. Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 31-83, June.
  5. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  6. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  7. Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 139-156, September.
  8. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers 9611r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
  10. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1999. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-035, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  11. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, 06.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  14. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
  15. Kin Chung Lo, 1999. "Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 621-633.
  16. Thomson, William, 2013. "A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 157-168.
  17. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  19. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  20. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," MPRA Paper 28262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
  22. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  23. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March.
  24. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
  25. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
  26. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2006. "Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 167-206, June.
  27. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  28. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  29. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  30. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).