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Citations for "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements"

by Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie

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  1. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, 06.
  3. George J. Mailath, 1996. "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?," Discussion Papers 1161, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
  5. Thomson, William, 2013. "A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 157-168.
  6. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products," MPRA Paper 28262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  8. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine.
  9. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1998. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," Working Papers 98-31, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  10. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
  11. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  12. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  13. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February.
  14. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  16. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  17. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  18. Perea, Andrés, 2011. "An algorithm for proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 510-525, June.
  19. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March.
  20. Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2011. "Common assumption of rationality," MPRA Paper 34441, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
  22. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  23. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  24. Peter J. Hammond, 1997. "Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games," Working Papers 97038, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  25. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
  26. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:20:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  28. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  29. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.