1. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • FORGES, Franoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
2. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
3. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1989. "Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 693, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
4. Chaim Fershtman, 1987. "Cooperation Through Delegation," Discussion Papers 731, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
5. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "A Connection Between Correlation in Game Theory and Quantum Mechanics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001725, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
6. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
8. Karl Iorio & Alejandro M. Manuelli, 1990. "Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games," Discussion Papers 915, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
9. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
10. Beth Allen, 2000. "The Future of Microeconomic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 143-150, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Board, Oliver J. & Blume, Andreas & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 395-440, December. [Downloadable!]
12. R. Joosten, 2005. "A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
13. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Discussion Papers 24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    • Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1603-1636, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
17. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
18. V. Denicolo' & P. Garella, 1996. "Bargaining with Noisy Communication," Working Papers 271, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
19. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) 04, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto). [Downloadable!]
20. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray, . "Can Mediation Improve Upon Cheap-Talk? A Note," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
22. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
23. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1986. "Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?," Discussion Papers 680, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
24. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
25. Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers 37, Yale University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1639, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001868, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 82, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    • Roger Lagunoff & Dino Gerardi & Luca Anderlini, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
26. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
27. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Adam Brandenburger, 2008. "The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002312, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
29. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
30. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. R. Joosten, 2007. "Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2007-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
32. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
33. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
34. Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2010-1-3.