Citations for "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"
by V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris
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- Michihiro Kandori, 2011.
"Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 877-892, 05.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics.
- V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1451, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- V. Bhaskar & G. J. Mailath & S. Morris, 2004.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Economics Discussion Papers
576, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1571, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- V.V. Bhaskar, 2007.
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
2007 Meeting Papers
136, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006.
"Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring,"
Theoretical Economics,
Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
2005 Meeting Papers
25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring,"
Discussion Papers
1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2008.
"A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009.
"A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:58:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
