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Citations for "Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies"

by Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sj–str–m

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1. Hisaki Kono, 2006. "Is group lending a good enforcement scheme for achieving high repayment rates? Evidence from field experiments in vietnam," Artefactual Field Experiments 00075, The Field Experiments Website.
2. J. David Brown & John S. Earle & Dana Lup, . "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles jse20052, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
   
   • Brown, J David & Earle, John S & Lup, Dana, 2005. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 33-70, October.
   • J. David Brown & John S. Earle & Dana Lup, 2003. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 03-94, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
   • J. David Brown & John Earle & Dana Lup, 2004. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance and the Business Environment in Romania," CERT Discussion Papers 0405, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
   • J. David Brown & John S. Earle & Dana Lup, 2004. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-702, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
   • Brown, J. David & Earle, John S. & Lup, Dana, 2004. "What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania," IZA Discussion Papers 1343, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
3. Gharad T. Bryan & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2012. "You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 17883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2012. "You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean & Zinman, Jonathan, 2012. "You Can Pick Your Friends, but You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment," Working Papers 99, Yale University, Department of Economics.
   • Gharad Bryan & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2012. "You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment," Working Papers 1009, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
4. Rai, Ashok S. & Klonner, Stefan, 2007. "Cosigners Help," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 18, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
5. Valentina Hartarska & Steven B. Caudill & Daniel M. Gropper, 2006. "The Cost Structure Of Microfinance Institutions In Eastern Europe And Central Asia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp809, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
6. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
   
   • Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 415-439, August.
7. Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
   
   • Francesco Columba & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2009. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 735, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
   • Columba, F. & Gambacorta, L. & Mistrulli, P.E., 2009. "Mutual Guarantee Institutions and Small Business Finance," Discussion Paper 2009-32 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Francesco Columba & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2009. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," BIS Working Papers 290, Bank for International Settlements.
8. Gine, Xavier & Karlan, Dean S., 2006. "Group versus individual liability : a field experiment in the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4008, The World Bank.
   
   • Dean Karlan & Xavier Giné, 2007. "Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," Working Papers 111, Center for Global Development.
   • Giné, Xavier & Karlan, Dean S., 2007. "Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," CEPR Discussion Papers 6193, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Xavier Gine & Dean Karlan, 2006. "Group versus individual liability: A field experiment in the philippines," Natural Field Experiments 00253, The Field Experiments Website.
   • Xavier Gine & Dean Karlan, 2006. "Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines," Working Papers 940, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
9. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," TSE Working Papers 10-146, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   
   • Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011. "When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 720-731, June.
   • Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," IDEI Working Papers 599, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
10. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2008. "Learning and Microlending," CEPR Discussion Papers 7011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
11. Bhole, Bharat & Ogden, Sean, 2010. "Group lending and individual lending with strategic default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 348-363, March.
12. Dean Karlan & Xavier Gine & Jonathan Morduch & Pamela Jakiela, 2006. "Microfinance Games," Working Papers 936, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    
    • Xavier Gin� & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2010. "Microfinance Games," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 60-95, July.
    • Xavier Gine & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2006. "Microfinance games," Framed Field Experiments 00150, The Field Experiments Website.
    • Gine, Xavier & Jakiela, Pamela & Karlan, Dean & Morduch, Jonathan, 2006. "Microfinance games," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3959, The World Bank.
    • Xavier Gine & Pamela Jakiela & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Morduch, 2006. "Microfinance Games," Working Papers 2102, The Field Experiments Website.
13. Daniel Clarke & Sefan Dercon, 2009. "Insurance, Credit and Safety Nets for the Poor in a World of Risk," Working Papers 81, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
14. Karlan, Dean S., 2007. "Social Connections and Group Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 6194, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    
    • DeanS. Karlan, 2007. "Social connections and group banking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages F52-F84, 02.
    • Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Social Connections and Group Banking," Working Papers 913, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    • Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Social Connections and Group Banking," Working Papers 181, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
15. Malgosia Madajewicz, 2004. "Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts," Discussion Papers 0304-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
16. Cull, Robert & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Morduch, Jonathan, 2008. "Microfinance meets the market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4630, The World Bank.
    
    • Robert Cull & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2009. "Microfinance Meets the Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 167-92, Winter.
17. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan & Pushkar Maitra, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1208, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    
    • Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012. "Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
18. Dehejia, Rajeev & Montgomery, Heather & Morduch, Jonathan, 2012. "Do interest rates matter? Credit demand in the Dhaka slums," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 437-449.
    
    • Dehejia, Rajeev & Montgomery, Heather & Morduch, Jonathan, 2005. "Do interest rates matter? credit demand in the Dhaka Slums," MPRA Paper 33146, University Library of Munich, Germany.
19. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
20. Cull, Robert & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Morduch, Jonathan, 2006. "Financial performance and outreach : a global analysis of leading microbanks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3827, The World Bank.
    
    • Robert Cull & Asli Demirguç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2007. "Financial performance and outreach: a global analysis of leading microbanks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages F107-F133, 02.
21. Ahlin, Christian & Jiang, Neville, 2008. "Can micro-credit bring development?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-21, April.
22. Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2008. "Cosigned vs. group loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1-2), pages 58-80, February.
23. Jeffrey Carpenter & Tyler Williams, 2010. "Moral hazard, peer monitoring, and microcredit: field experimental evidence from Paraguay," Working Papers 10-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
24. Abdul Karim, Zulkefly, 2009. "Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting," MPRA Paper 23934, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jan 2010.
25. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
26. repec:feb:artefa:0063 is not listed on IDEAS
27. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Group-lending with sequential financing, joint liability and social capital," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-23, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.

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