1. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1451, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & G. J. Mailath & S. Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 576, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1571, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
2. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1601, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
5. Antonio Rangel, 2000. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," NBER Working Papers 7518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Rangel, 1999. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," Working Papers 00001, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, . "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Xue, J., 2006. "Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Local Interaction," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0612, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
8. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
9. Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Stanley Reiter, 1999. "Coordination of Economic Activity: An Example," Discussion Papers 1263, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
11. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
12. A. Muthoo & K. A. Shepsle, 2003. "Agenda Setting Power in Organizations With Overlapping Generations of Players," Economics Discussion Papers 553, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    • Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
15. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters and Harry A.A. Verbon, 1999. "Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-019/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Offerman, Theo & Potters, Jan & Verbon, Harrie A. A., 2001. "Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 264-275, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2008. "A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification," CEPR Discussion Papers 6805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2005. "Sustaining Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Seminar Papers 731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
    • Martin Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," 2004 Meeting Papers 199, Society for Economic Dynamics.
19. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
20. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    • Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September. [Downloadable!]
22. Kiho Yoon, 2001. "An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 736-745, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001513, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
25. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.