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Citations for "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria"

by Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Magnoli Bocchi, Alessandro, 2008. "Rising growth, declining investment : the puzzle of the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4472, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eduardo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 113, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1984. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 726, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," Economics Working Papers 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604. [Downloadable!]
  13. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Kenneth Njoroge, 2003. "Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1025-1025. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  16. Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "Reputation and Turnover," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ariane Lambert Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2006. "Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel - Favoritism in Procurement Auctions -," PSE Working Papers 2006-39, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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  18. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  19. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  20. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  22. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Michihiro Kandori, 1999. "Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-45, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  24. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  25. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  26. Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  27. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  29. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  30. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-21.

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