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Citations for "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability"

by Spence, A Michael

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bruce I. Carlin & Simon Gervais, 2009. "Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 14972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven Matthews & John Moore, 1985. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Discussion Papers 661, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Bertola, Giuseppe & Hochguertel, Stefan & Koeniger, Winfried, 2002. "Dealer Pricing of Consumer Credit," CEPR Discussion Papers 3160, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Joshua Graff Zivin & Richard Just & David Zilberman, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety," NBER Working Papers 9678, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Lynch, Michael & Miller, Ross M. & Plott, Charles R. & Porter, Russell., 1984. "Product Quality, Informational Efficiency and Regulations in Experimental Markets," Working Papers 518, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., 2003. "A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: the economic contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 3-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Abraham Wickelgren, . "The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1061, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  10. Steven Matthews & John Moore, 1984. "Monopoly Provision of Product Quality and Warranties," Discussion Papers 585R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Working Papers 0703, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Roland Kirstein & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, . "Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007-1-1172, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Nancy A. Lutz & Philip H. Dybvig, 1989. "Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 922, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Martina Eckardt, 2007. "Does Signaling Work in Markets for Information Services? An Empirical Investigation for Insurance Intermediaries in Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 77, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, 2005. "Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1700-1711, December. [Downloadable!]
  17. Sandra Hoffmann & W. Hanemann, 2005. "Torts and the Protection of 'Legally Recognized Interests'," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 1025, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  18. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1978. "Problems of market adjustments to occupational safety and health hazards," MPRA Paper 7998, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  19. Palumbo, Giuliana & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2002. "Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 451, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  20. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2005. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 11755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, . "Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1160, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Tapiero, Charles, 2003. "Risk Management: An Interdisciplinary Framework," ESSEC Working Papers DR 03014, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School. [Downloadable!]
  24. Li, Kunpeng & Chhajed, Dilip & Mallik, Suman, 2005. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains," Working Papers 05-0128, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  25. Aidan Hollis, 1996. "Exclusivity Restrictions in Markets with Adverse Selection: The Case of Extended Warranties," Working Papers ecpap-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  26. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  27. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  28. David Hakes & Dongsoo Shin, 2008. "Warranties as a device to extract rent from low-risk users of a product," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  29. Johanna Vásquez Velásquez & Karoll Gómez Portilla, 2004. "Selección adversa en el régimen contributivo de salud: el caso de la EPS de Susalud," BORRADORES DEL CIE 003489, UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE. [Downloadable!]
  30. Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, 2007. "Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?," NBER Working Papers 13561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  31. Cinzia COLAPINTO, 2006. "Market power and product quality: review of the literature," Departemental Working Papers 2006-35, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  32. Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others," NBER Working Papers 10972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.


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