Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

Citations

Cited by:

1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," MPRA Paper 95637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 13881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
3. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
   • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 45243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
5. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper 106427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
6. Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017. "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 133-164.
7. Takanori Adachi, 2010. "Ownership Structure as a Continuous Variable: A Note on Joint Ownership in the Grossman-Hart-Moore Theory of the Firm," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2112-2118.
8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," MPRA Paper 43407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
10. Vijay Mohan, 2014. "A Note On The Property Rights Theory And The Ex Ante Value Of Information," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 205-215, April.
11. Oliver Gürtler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2015. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(7), pages 695-713, October.
    • Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0046, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    • Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0045, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    • Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0151, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    • Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 0047, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    • Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 1124, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
12. Linsheng Yang & Jintao Gong & Bihao Wang, 2023. "Analysis on Stochastic Change Characteristics of Technological Innovation Efficiency under Endogenous Change in Technological Information and Investment of Knowledge Capital," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-27, March.
13. Tomas Mantecon & Kyojik Song & Haowen Luo, 2016. "The Control and Performance of Joint Ventures," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 431-465, May.
14. Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013. "Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    • Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
15. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," MPRA Paper 90790, University Library of Munich, Germany.
16. Bragelien, Iver & Impink, Joost, 2014. "Relationship-Specificity, Bargaining Power Growth, and Firm Performance," Discussion Papers 2014/4, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
17. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
    • MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 44953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
19. Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2017. "A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 281-302, February.
20. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
21. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 107609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 16003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 53717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
23. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
26. Oliver Gürtler, 2012. "A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 13(1), pages 76-84, February.
27. Mantecon, Tomas & Liu, Ian & Gao, Fei, 2012. "Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1045-1056.
28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 33-37.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 91458, University Library of Munich, Germany.
29. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
30. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 7331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
31. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, June.
32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 13841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 97912, University Library of Munich, Germany.
33. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
    • Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 44240, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 9287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
34. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 91460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 12174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
35. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 18048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," MPRA Paper 117065, University Library of Munich, Germany.
36. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
37. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
38. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 117742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
39. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
40. Gattai, Valeria & Natale, Piergiovanna, 2016. "Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 109-113.
41. Rajagopal & Ananya Rajagopal, 2019. "Impact of transaction costs on supply operations and price competitiveness in wholesale marketing: a study in reference to Mexico," International Journal of Logistics Systems and Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 33(4), pages 525-542.
42. Moriki Hosoe & Iltae Kim (ed.), 2020. "Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-981-15-3300-6, December.
43. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 100-112.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 15514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," MPRA Paper 105106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
44. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," MPRA Paper 41966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
45. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
46. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 91457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
47. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
48. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
49. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
50. Macchiavello, Rocco, 2007. "Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 6104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
51. Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, 2021. "Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 219-260.
52. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 514-532.
53. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 9510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
54. Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija, 2012. "Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 939-945.
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55. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
56. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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57. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Optimal Ownership Structures in the Presence of Investment Signals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 103, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
58. Mori, Yusuke, 2020. "Ex ante investment, ex post adaptation, and joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
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60. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
61. Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2014. "Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: a Review of the Literature," Working Papers 287, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2014.
62. Pablo Casas-Arce & Thomas Kittsteiner & F. Asís Martínez-Jerez, 2019. "Contracting with Opportunistic Partners: Theory and Application to Technology Development and Innovation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 842-858, February.
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67. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
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