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Citations for "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information"

by MacDonald, Glenn M

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  1. repec:fth:prinin:328 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1994. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers 707, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  4. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
  5. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about oneĀ’'s own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  7. Oyer, Paul, 2008. "Ability and employer learning: Evidence from the economist labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 268-289, June.
  8. Orn B. Bodvarsson, 1987. "Monitoring with No Moral Hazard: The Case of Small Vessel Commercial Fishing," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 421-434, Oct-Dec.
  9. Matthew J. Clayton & Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua V. Rosenberg, 2003. "The impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility," Staff Reports 166, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  10. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Turnover wages and adverse selection," Working Paper 8717, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  12. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F., 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Scholarly Articles 3442782, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91.
  14. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May.
  15. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2005. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 681-724, October.
  16. Arnaud Dupuy & Lex Borghans, 2005. "Supply and demand, allocation and wage inequality: an international comparison," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(9), pages 1073-1088.
  17. Maitreesh Ghatak & Alexander Karaivanov, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnershipso," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 024, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  18. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
  19. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.