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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

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Author Info
Armin Falk
Ernst Fehr
Urs Fischbacher

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Abstract

In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number iewwp055.

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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:055

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Related research
Keywords: common pool resources experiments fairness reciprocity game theory fairness models

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2008. "Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 287-303, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gerlinde Fellner & Magdalena Margreiter & Nuria Oses Eraso, 2003. "When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sadrieh, A. & Fischer, M.E. & Irlenbusch, B., 2003. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment," Discussion Paper 57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Gilles, R.P. & Lazarova, E.A. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2008. "Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach," Discussion Paper 2008-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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