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Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level

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Author Info
Bischoff, Ivo

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Abstract

The paper addresses the welfare implications of conditional grants if government failure leads to inefficiencies in the production of regional public goods and services. Conditional grants may improve welfare by setting incentives for regions to improve efficiency. At the same time, resources are wasted in the process of grant-seeking. This paper provides a theoretical model to assess the net effect on welfare. A three-stage game-theoretic context is developed and simulations are performed to derive the optimal grant-distribution scheme. We found conditional grants to be welfare-enhancing in the vast majority of simulated scenarios under a classical utilitarian welfare function. Once distributional concerns are accounted for, the scope for conditional grants becomes limited. --

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 08-031.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7303

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Related research
Keywords: conditional grants; government failure; rent-seeking; normative public finance;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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  7. Grossman, Philip J, 1996. "The Distribution of Federal Grants-in-Aid: The Increasing Importance of PACS Relative to State and Local Political Parties," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 28(8), pages 975-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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