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New evidence on ownership structures in Germany

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  • Köke, Jens
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    Abstract

    Ownership structures are an important element of the theory explaining corporate governance. This study presents detailed descriptive evidence on the ownership structures of German manufacturing firms. It addresses several shortcomings of the previous German empirical literature: First, we study all legal forms of a Kapitalgesellschaft, firms that generally have a separation of ownership and control. We do not focus exclusively on the listed Aktiengesellschaft (AG) but include many non-listed firms. Second, we examine changes in the ownership structure. This is a new and important approach because these changes are frequently related to corporate performance. Third, we analyze the higher levels of ownership structures, i.e. ownership structures of the direct owners. Thereby we address an issue quant itatively which only recently became subject of empirical studies. Finally, we find that crossownership is of minor relevance in the German manufacturing sector. However, our measure of cross-ownership represents only a lower bound. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 99-60.

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    Date of creation: 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5273

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    Keywords: ownership structure; corporate governance;

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    References

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    1. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
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    4. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe11, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    5. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
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    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    9. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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    11. Lucian Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 1999. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights," NBER Working Papers 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    18. Leech, D. & Leahy, J., 1989. "Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications And The Performance Of Large British Companies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 345, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    19. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    20. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    21. Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, 1996. "Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms," NBER Working Papers 5453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Wenger, E & Kaserer, C, 1997. "The German System of Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated," Papers 14, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-.
    23. Willard T. Carleton & James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1335-1362, 08.
    24. Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
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    Cited by:
    1. T. Biebuyck & Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires," DULBEA Working Papers in, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Christoph Kaserer & Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2008. "Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, March.

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