The national regulatory structure against the background of the European regulatory system
AbstractStates and their representatives, national governments, play a key role in national telecommunication markets. As lawmakers, they determine the playing field of the agents in the markets and the decision powers of national regulators. Simultaneously, they are involved in appointing presidential chambers of national regulators. On the other hand, governments keep shares in regulated companies and support single infrastructure projects based on financial and legal state aid measures. Therefore, European Union regulatory frameworks require a strict separation of tasks between national ministries. However, the European Commission has repeatedly criticized member states for in-transparency and insufficient separations of tasks in national implementation. While the Second Regulatory Package balanced competition and investment aims, the new Regulatory Package implemented in December 2009 dedicates a higher weight to the role of infrastructure quality as a driver of service innovations. Moreover, national regulators become more independent, and former national regulation tasks are partially shifted to the pan-European level. In consequence, the role of governments also changes. I discuss the transposition process of Regulatory Packages to national laws and how they have been implemented on the national level to learn more about how the new Regulatory Package will affect the national situation and the European integration process. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 10-089.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
telecommunication infrastructure; local loop competition; regulatory independence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center
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