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Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ansätze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung

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  • Lippert, Inge
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    Abstract

    Die Corporate-Governance-Forschung hat sich lange Zeit vor allem auf die Veränderungen in den kontinentaleuropäischen „Insidersystemen“ konzentriert. Nach den dramatischen Unternehmensskandalen in den USA und im Zuge der steigenden Anforderungen an ein „nachhaltiges Wirtschaften“ werden in den letzten Jahren jedoch auch die Veränderungen in den angelsächsischen „Ousidersystemen“ stärker thematisiert. Damit wird die Prinzipal- Agenten-Theorie als die bislang dominierende Theorie der Corporate Governance einer grundlegenden Kritik unterzogen. Es verstärkt sich der Ruf nach neuen theoretischen Modellen, die der komplexen Realität dynamischer Corporate-Governance-Systeme besser entsprechen, als das klassische Paradigma. Die kritische Reflexion der Principal-Agent- Annahmen hat in den angelsächsischen Ländern in den letzten Jahren zu einem Aufschwung von Ansätzen und Studien geführt, die gegenüber der traditionellen Forschung breitere Sichtweisen auf die Corporate Governance einnehmen und neue Fragen im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung der Systeme aufwerfen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung werden in Deutschland noch wenig diskutiert. Sie können aber wichtige Impulse für die Diskussion zur Reform der Unternehmensmitbestimmung und Weiterentwicklung der Aufsichtsratsarbeit bieten. Ziel des Literaturberichts ist es, die neueren Ansätze und Studien in Abgrenzung zur Principal-Agent- Theorie darzustellen und damit Ansatzpunkte für eine ressourcen- und prozessbezogene Veränderungsperspektive des deutschen Corporate-Governance-Systems zu entwickeln. -- For many years corporate governance research has mainly focused on changes in the “insider systems” of corporate governance in continental Europe. Due to the dramatic company scandals in the US and the increasing demands for a sustainable economy, however, this focus has shifted: tendencies toward change in the Anglo-Saxon “outsider systems” have become points of greater concern. Along with this, the “principal agent theory” as the dominant theory of corporate governance is increasingly being challenged. New theoretical models are called for, which could better explain the complex reality of changing corporate governance systems. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, a critical scrutiny of the assumptions of principal agent theory has reinforced new alternative approaches and studies which, unlike the classical research, draw on wider perspectives of corporate governance and raise fundamentally different questions concerning the design of the system. The results of this research have not been very broadly circulated and discussed in Germany up to now, but they could bring some new insights into the current discourse surrounding co-determination reforms and improvements in supervisory board work. The purpose of this report is to present these new approaches and studies, contrast them to principle agency theory, and in so doing develop points of reference for a resource and process-oriented perspective of change in the German corporate governance system.

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    Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work with number SP III 2008-302.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbkpw:spiii2008302

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