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Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making

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  • Drexl, Moritz
  • Kleiner, Andreas
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    Abstract

    We study decision rules for committees that repeatedly take a binary decision. Committee members are privately informed about their payoffs and monetary transfers are not feasible. In static environments, the only strategy-proof mechanisms are voting rules which are criticized for being inefficient as they do not condition on preference intensities. The dynamic structure of repeated decision-making allows for richer decision rules that overcome this inefficiency by making use of information on preference intensities. Nonetheless, we show that often simple voting is optimal for two-person committees. This holds for many prior type distributions and irrespective of the agents' patience. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79832.

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    Date of creation: 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79832

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    1. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2010. "Inefficiencies on linking decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 471-486, March.
    2. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R & Riezman, Raymond, 2005. "Minorities and Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1672R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2009.
    5. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
    6. Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2012. "Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 593 - 658.
    7. Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
    9. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
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