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Ausschluss und Zwang in Kollektiven

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  • Mackscheidt, Klaus
  • Banov, Bancho
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    Abstract

    Mitgliedzwang in Kollektiven wird mit dem Argument verteidigt, dass nur so der gewöhnlich unerfahrene Kunde einer beruflichen Leistung vor schadhafter Arbeit mit eventuell katastrophalen Folgen geschützt sei: die Zwangsmitgliedschaft als typischer Fall zur Aufhebung oder Abmilderung asymmetrischer Informationen. Die Gefahr ist jedoch immer immanent, dass eher berufliche Kartelle zur Absicherung eines gesichert hohen Einkommens der Mitglieder entstehen und die Gesellschaft somit wegen der Einschränkung des Wettbewerbs einen Wohlfahrtsverlust erleidet. In diesem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass es neben den Grundtypen der Zwangsmitgliedschaft noch viele andere versteckte Typen der Mitgliederexklusivität gibt, die den Kollektivmitgliedern finanzielle und statusmäßige Vorteile gewähren, die insgesamt aber zulasten der Wohlfahrt aller übrigen Gesellschaftsmitglieder gehen. Zum Abschluss wird gezeigt, dass die Ausbeutung der breiten Gesellschaft durch die Berufs- und Parteielite in den Zentralverwaltungswirtschaften ein typischer Fall der angewandten Kollektivgütertheorie ist und längst vorher hätte entdeckt werden können. -- It is often argued that compulsory memberships in collectives can help to protect inexperienced customers of professional service from faulty work and its consequences: Hence, compulsory memberships serve as a typical tool to reduce the harm from asymmetric information. However, there is always some danger of professional cartels to occur that safeguard secured high income among its members and thus might harm welfare by restraining competition. In this contribution we show that, besides standard types, there are several other less obvious types of compulsory memberships. Those usually benefit the collective's members but do harm the remaining members of the society. At last, we will show that the exploitation by professional and political party elites in command economies can serve as a good example of applied public good theory and should have been examined at a far earlier point in time.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics in its series FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge with number 10-1.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:uoccpe:101

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    Keywords: Zwangsmitgliedschaft in Kollektiven; Compulsory Memberships in Collectives;

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