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Vertrauen : Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

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  • Sell, Friedrich L.
  • Wiens, Marcus
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    Abstract

    In diesem Beitrag diskutieren wir den in der Literatur heftig umstrittenen Aspekt, ob Vertrauen (Institutionen) nur ein Komplement zu formellen Institutionen (Vertrauen) sein oder diese(s) möglicherweise sogar substituieren kann (können). Wir fassen Vertrauen als spezifische, kooperative Investition auf. Dem Vertrauensgeber geht es dabei um die Verlässlichkeit des Vertrauensnehmers ("reliability"). Der Wert einer Vertrauensbeziehung besteht in nicht weniger als in dem sozialen Überschuss, den sie entstehen lassen kann. Ohne weiteres (Reputationseffekte, Trigger Strategien etc.) kommt diese Beziehung aber nicht zustande. Auch anreizkompatible Verträge können das Dilemma nicht lösen. Dafür aber kann die Zahlung des individuell geregelten Schadensersatzes (perfekte Jurisdiktion) dafür Sorge tragen, die Parteien zur Realisierung der sozial optimalen Lösung zu bewegen. Ein ähnlich hoher sozialer Überschuss kann auch dann erreicht werden, wenn bei imperfekter Jurisdiktion der Vertrauensgeber den größeren Teil dieses Überschusses verantwortet. -- In this paper, we discuss the heavily debated issue whether trust (formal institutions) can only serve as complement(s) or rather as substitute(s) of formal institutions (trust). We take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the reliability of the trustee. The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. Without additional provisions such as trigger strategies, reputation effects etc., however, a trust relationship will not evolve in a one shot game. Not even incentive compatible contracts can solve the dilemma. In a perfect jurisdiction world, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages". A comparable social surplus can also be achieved in a non-perfect jurisdiction world. A necessary condition is that the trustor is responsible for the larger part of the social surplus.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universität der Bundeswehr München, Economic Research Group in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 2005,1.

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    Date of creation: 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20051

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    Keywords: Vertrauen; Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts; Neue Institutionenökonomik;

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    1. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
    2. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
    3. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
    4. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 526-556, June.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, 1999. "Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 84-105, Spring.
    6. Lorenz, Edward, 1999. "Trust, Contract and Economic Cooperation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 301-15, May.
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