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Die Ergebnisse des Bonner Klimagipfels: Strategisches Verhandeln unter den Bedingungen globaler Umweltgüter

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  • Mittendorf, Marcus
  • Sell, Friedrich L.
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    Abstract

    Durch die Aufweichung des Kyoto-Protokolls gelang es während des Bonner Klimagipfels die aus Sicht ihrer jeweiligen Interessenlage heterogenen Länder Japan, Australien, Kanada und Rußland trotz Absage der USA in den internationalen Klimaschutz einzubinden. Mit Hilfe des Optionswertes des Wartens wird untersucht, welche Entscheidungsanreize für diese Länder, aber auch für ihren Gegenspieler, die EU, bestanden haben und warum eine Einigung möglich wurde. Diese Ergebnisse lassen Rückschlüsse zu, wann es auch für die USA sinnvoll sein wird, zum Klimaschutz beizutragen. -- The Climate Summit of Bonn in 2001 was able to rescue the Kyoto protocol at the price of softening its provisions: Despite the unwillingness of the US government to sign any contract, major players with quite heterogeneous interests, such as Japan, Australia, Canada and Russia could be convinced to share a treaty on the protection of the global climate. In this paper, it is our aim to explain the incentives of the involved parties, their strategies and the logic of the agreement which was finally achieved. We do this by adopting a model which has already proved to be robust and successful in the theory of foreign direct investment: the option value of waiting. Furthermore, our results tend to suggest when and why it will be profitable and wise for the US authorities to join the protection of the global climate.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universität der Bundeswehr München, Economic Research Group in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 2002,2.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20022

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    Keywords: Klimapolitik; Umweltgüter; Optionswert des Wartens; Climate Policy; Environmental Goods; Option Value of Waiting;

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    1. Dixit, Avinash K, 1989. "Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 620-38, June.
    2. Zhang, Zhong Xiang, 1999. "Estimating the size of the potential market for the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms," CCSO Working Papers 199920, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
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